WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
SECUCITIES
CITIES AGAINST TERRORISM

TRAINING LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES
IN FACING TERRORISM

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INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The context for the project

Terrorism has been a reality in many European countries for decades and a great number of European cities are faced with a continuing threat. It seriously threatens the safety, the values of democratic states and the rights and liberties which citizens enjoy. As communist ideologies collapsed, European countries’ human rights levels developed, forms of expression of democracy became more developed, and terrorism became a formal category of crime without any justification, whatever the circumstances.

By trying to exploit social and cultural inequalities within societies, terrorism may provoke responses favouring discriminatory actions and encourage aggressive or racist attitudes.1

Acts of terrorism bring about long-term negative effects for cities and high social costs not only from a financial, but also from a psychological point of view, due to victims’ individualised trauma and the overall experience of the population confronted with the perils of terrorism.

Following the resolution of the Council of Europe, the project Cities against terrorism (CAT) is exploring the role of the local and regional authorities to deal with the terrorist threat in Europe: “Local and regional authorities, alongside national governments and international organisations and agencies, have a clear responsibility to protect their citizens against terrorist attacks and threats to a democratic way of life.”

Even with strong and global public support, the fight against terrorism requires great courage, determination and commitment on the part of governing authorities. It has become a public and political priority, of greater relevance than ever before, despite the fact that terrorism did not begin on 11th September 2001. It requires “constant and extensive vigilance, co-ordination between a range of partners, effective legislation against violence and a determined and proactive judicial and political approach to racial and religious intolerance and extremism”.3

The cities of the European Forum for Urban Safety have been involved for a long time in a fight against any disregard for the safety of their inhabitants, which is based on promoting a social system respecting the rights of citizens, especially the most vulnerable, and on the tolerance of diversity. It is the duty of cities to prevent

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3 Ibid.
terrorism from finding a breeding ground in exclusion, in division between cultures and religions, in the despair of the marginalised and in all forms of injustice.

In tackling terrorism, local elected officials and local authorities play a key role, in terms of the immediate response to a terrorist act and crisis management, as well as in developing public solidarity and community relations in the long term, as the most recent experiences of New York, Madrid, and London have shown. They have a duty to raise awareness among the population regarding the threat of terrorism, whilst avoiding causing panic and confrontations between different groups of the population. They must act as mediators between the global issues within which terrorism develops and the local concerns of the population confronted with an actual or perceived threat. This is why the issue of communication around terrorism is particularly sensitive for elected officials.

A wealth of experiences and practices existing among European cities can help local elected officials face the threat of terrorist attacks, prevent future risks, mobilise the population against threats against safety and assist victims’ recovery by various means of social and psychological support provided by local authorities and organisations. Exchanging and promoting best practices, capitalizing local successes and giving them a European dimension is also part of the EFUS’ role, hence the interest it took in coordinating this project.

1.2 The objectives of the project

The Cities Against Terrorism (CAT) project, co-ordinated by the European Forum for Urban Safety from 2006 to 2007 with the support of the European Commission\(^4\), has proposed the development of communication training for local representatives, to help them improve their capacity to publicly confront terrorist threats, to develop public solidarity, to build partnerships with civil society, to lead information campaigns on victim support and more generally to mobilise public opinion against terrorism in all its forms.

The main objective of the project was to create a training package during four seminars involving communication experts, security specialists and contemporary researchers on the terrorist threat.

The more particular aims of the four seminars were to provide answers to four thematic challenges addressed by the project:

- immediate emergency response after a terrorist attack,
- crisis management and communication,
- building solidarity and public support,
- preventing terrorism and developing community relations.

\(^4\) DG Justice, Freedom and Security, Pilot Project for Victims of Acts of Terrorism, 2005
Each of the seminars has followed the same methodology, bringing together city representatives, universities and experts in each thematic field.

The set of universal guidelines developed during the project seminars was then presented to the EFUS’ network of cities at the final conference involving major European cities and universities, as well as representatives of the European Union and other European organisations (notably the Council of Europe and NATO).

In addition to the training package, the wider objectives of the project included:
- first of all, improving local elected officials’ political and professional expertise
- secondly, reinforcing the academic and local expertise in the field of tackling terrorist threats
- and finally, improving exchanges and transfer of knowledge between the two

Cooperating with universities regarding the development of a training package was believed to be a crucial advantage and contribution to the project, thanks to their academic expertise in the area of terrorism, which is very often lacking on the local as well as other levels of government. In facing and tackling terrorism, a greater focus on knowledge provided by the universities is more and more needed, as well as better use of this knowledge in co-operation between universities and all actors involved.

Another objective with regards to training was the development of a new teaching module for the proposed European Urban Safety Masters degree in the area of confronting terrorist threats. This objective is closely related to the continuous cooperation of the EFUS with European universities within the Urban Safety Training Network in Europe⁵, aimed at joint co-operation to identify the elements of a European dimension concerning urban security and the development of joint programmes and specialised courses, with a view to creating the European Masters degree in Urban Safety.

For several months, the project’s partners helped carry out the project activities, culminating in the final conference, where the results of the project were discussed and presented to a larger audience. Eventually, a set of universal training guidelines was drawn up, aimed at helping the cities face terrorism in all its forms, whilst respecting human rights and cultural differences.

Unfortunately, it proved too ambitious to develop a genuine training package and the teaching module for the European Masters degree within the period of 15 months. The duration was not the only cause, as it was difficult to collect enough data on cities to allow the fight against terrorism to be tackled at the local level. The majority of cities, except for the large capital cities, have not greatly considered the aspect of training of the people involved in this area and on the issue of fighting against terrorism at the local level in general. Consequently, this project aims

⁵ http://urbansafetytraining.fesu.org
partly to underline the local dimension of the fight against terrorism, and partly to emphasise the need for local authorities to develop a preventative approach.

Even if a complete continual training package has not been formally developed within this project, the process of reflection which began during the seminars and the final conference has allowed the EFUS to continue reflecting on the place for cities in the fight against terrorism, in particular regarding prevention.

1.3 Project partners

The main project partners are the following four European universities, who have assigned university coordinators and their assistants to help the EFUS in the implementation of the project activities and who were in charge of writing the seminar reports.

1. University of the West of England - Community Safety and Crime Prevention Unit, Bristol, United Kingdom

People involved:
Henry Shaftoe, senior lecturer (coordinator)
Dr Sara-Jayne Williams (assistant)


People involved:
Prof. Nelson Lourenço (coordinator)
Maria da Graça Frias (assistant)

3. University of Silesia - Department of Law and Administration, Katowice, Poland

People involved:
Dr Jacek Barcik (coordinator)
Ilona Topa (assistant)

4. University of Tübingen - Institute of Criminology, Tübingen, Germany.

People involved:
Prof. Hans Jürgen-Kerner (coordinator)
Marc Coester (assistant)
Klaus Bott (assistant)

Each university had its own interest and motivation for participating in the project, but they were all united in sharing their expertise and providing scientific contributions to the development of practical guidelines for local authorities.
The Community Safety and Crime Prevention Unit at the University of the West of England has a long established track record in teaching and researching crime prevention. It has also developed a particular interest in comparing the approaches of different European countries which are trying to create safer urban environments. It was therefore a logical extension of their interests to look at the problem of terrorism and see if the tools available to prevent crime can be applied or adapted to reduce the risk of terrorist incidents. The Unit has consistently supported the notion that local authorities have a crucial role in creating safer communities and believe that the range of services they provide can also help make communities safer from terrorism.

SociNova (The Applied Sociology Research Centre of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa) has already been scientifically interested for some years in crime, violence and security. Researchers from this Centre have been working on projects related to: crimes reported to the police forces (PSP – Public Security Police; GNR – National Republican Guard; PJ – Judiciary Police), urban security management, representations of violence and of the “feeling of insecurity”, youth, delinquency and drugs, in partnership with institutions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Centre for Judiciary Studies from the Ministry of Justice, the Municipality of Oeiras and the Institute on Drugs and Drug Addiction. The Department of Sociology at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa also offers a Masters degree on Violence, Crime and Internal Security; themes closely related to terrorism. Participating in this project has constituted an opportunity for the Centre to improve skills on terrorism, a core theme in contemporary societies’ concerns.

For the University of Silesia in Katowice, establishing close cooperation between research institutions and local authorities, especially to produce an efficient crisis management system, was considered crucial. Sharing practical experiences and learning from different European states was treated as a cornerstone of such cooperation within the CAT project.

For many years now, the University of Silesia has developed well-established relations with local security managers. Its list of courses includes post–graduate studies on “Security in Urban Areas”, which is targeted at practitioners from local authorities, police, fire-departments and people dealing with the threat of terrorism. Providing support for the victims of various disasters has been an issue of great importance. For this reason, the University set up the Centre of Psychological Assistance in Crisis Situations, which cooperates with the Centre of Crisis Management.

The Institute of Criminology in Tübingen is the biggest and oldest University-Institute of Criminology in Germany. Since 1962 it has been recognised in Germany and across the world as a distinguished research centre in the areas of crime and delinquent behaviour. In particular, politically motivated crime has been one of the important areas of analysis since its creation, as well as the German
terrorism period of the Red Army Fraction (RAF) in the 1970s. With the new threat of terrorism in the 21st century, and because Germany - one of the biggest economies in the world - is a potential target of terrorist attacks, this subject is of an increasing importance for criminological research. Moreover, co-operation between research institutes and local authorities has become more and more important since German soldiers serve not only in Afghanistan, but also in other conflict zones. With this in mind, it is of great importance for the University of Tübingen that science and research contribute to this topic in order to help analyse and prevent terrorist acts in the future.

In addition to the above universities, external speakers such as city representatives and experts in the area of terrorism from neighbouring member states have been encouraged to contribute with their expertise in order to achieve broad EU representation and ensure a European dimension, which is necessary for concerted actions to be taken to provide support for victims of terrorist acts and long-term assistance to local government officials. Detailed information about the CAT project is available on the EFUS website\(^6\), where anyone interested can download additional material on all project stages and developments.

1.4 The approach followed and the people targeted

Within the project duration, four seminars were organised, one at each partner university, followed by the final conference in Brussels during which the results of the project were distributed.

With regards to the content of the seminars, they all covered the main four themes addressed by the project, namely:

- immediate emergency response after a terrorist attack,
- crisis management and communication,
- building solidarity and public support,
- preventing terrorism and developing community relations.

However, the particular focus differed among universities, depending on their specialisation and significance of the terrorism aspects that the coordinators and assistants found more useful to debate in their respective countries.

The first seminar took place in Bristol (United Kingdom) on the 28th and 29th September 2006 with approximately 30 people attending, including the police, municipal emergency planning officers, security specialists and academics. This particular seminar, entitled "Reducing the Risk & Impact of Terrorism – A Local Authority’s Role", and co-organised by the University of the West of England, focused on what could be done to prevent terrorism with attention to minimising the harms and disruption caused by terrorist incidents (covered by a simulation exercise). A lot of

\(^6\) http://www.urbansecurity.org
attention was concentrated on working in partnership with local communities in order to prevent the emergence and the threat of terrorism and to promote situational and social interventions to lead to a sustainable reduction in terrorism. The seminar in the United Kingdom was also a very good occasion to discuss the impact of the London bombings on community transport safety after the events of 7th July 2005.

The second seminar in Lisbon, co-organised by the Universidade Nova de Lisboa in co-operation with Universidade Atlântica, took place on the 26th and 27th of October 2006. Its aim was to debate the issues of risk reduction and crisis management in case of a terrorist attack. The four main themes to which special attention was directed included: long-term action in dealing with terrorism, crisis management and emergency response, support for the victims of terrorism, and the role of local authorities in the face of a terrorist threat. Although Portugal has not had direct experience with terrorism, the public was quite receptive to the discussion, as demonstrated by the large number of participants. The event was attended by more than 100 people, including representatives of all Portuguese police forces, academics, municipalities, government institutions and international security specialists.

“Local communities in the face of terrorist threats: confronting European experiences and practical lessons for local authorities”. This was the title of the third seminar in Katowice, co-organised by the University of Silesia on November 13th-14th, 2006. Its principal goal was to elaborate, by sharing the experiences of several European countries, a proper defence mechanism in case of a terrorist attack, especially in the fields of prevention, emergency response and cooperation with the local authorities, as well as the development of public solidarity with victims of terrorist acts. Similarly to Portugal, Poland has not experienced any significant terrorist attack, but constitutes a potential target for radical Islamist terrorist groups due to its foreign policy. Attended by local authority staff, representatives of regional authorities, academics and specialists in charge of maintaining security in the municipalities, this seminar assembled more than 30 people.

The last seminar, co-organised by the University of Tübingen, was held in Tübingen on 27th-28th November 2006. Entitled “How to deal with Terrorist Threats? Major problems and handling opportunities for local authorities”, it directly addressed the audience: local authorities’ staff and elected members, employees of the police force, Ministries and emergency management services. Germany has already been a target of a failed suitcase-bombing on two regional trains, on July 31st, 2006. In the immediate aftermath, the debate surrounding prevention of terrorism in the cities turned out to be very constructive and inspiring. Over the two days, around 50 participants discussed a wide range of topics, including prevention, long-term strategies against terrorism, as well as concrete counter-terrorism measures from the cities’ perspectives.
In addition to the above four seminars, two coordination meetings with the universities were organised by EFUS. The first, held at the beginning of the project in Paris, was devoted to explaining the project, its objectives, activities, financing and seminar preparation. The other seminar was organised in Zaragoza on November 2\textsuperscript{nd}-3\textsuperscript{rd} 2006\textsuperscript{8} and provided an opportunity to draw conclusions from the Bristol and Lisbon seminars, as well as to discuss the intermediate findings, to monitor the development of the project and to prepare for the final report.

The final stage of the project, the dissemination conference in Brussels on 10\textsuperscript{th} and 11\textsuperscript{th} September, was organised by EFUS, the Standing Monitoring Committee for the Belgian Police and the police authorities from the Bruxelles-Capitale-Ixelles region. This allowed the final report to be presented, which was based on the project’s results derived from the four preceding local seminars, including recommendations from the cities, and the training guidelines for local authorities helping them to confront and prevent terrorism. The event was also an opportunity to share and analyse the experiences and expectations of other cities not previously familiarised with the project and to address the guidelines developed by the original project partners.

This report presents the findings of the four seminars and the final conference, which led to the finalisation of the training guidelines for cities. Following the introduction of Part I, Part II illustrates terrorism as a multidimensional phenomenon and describes the relevance of the local level in tackling terrorism. Part III assembles the debates from the four seminars, divided into the main project themes, which are supported by concrete, practical examples of measures. The outcomes of the CAT project for the local authorities are gathered in Part IV and the report finishes with the conclusions in Part V.

\textsuperscript{8} The 2\textsuperscript{nd} co-ordination meeting of the CAT project took place during the Saragossa conference, organised by the EFUS on 2-3-4 November 2006. The conference website: http://zaragoza2006.fesu.org/
TERRORISM AT LOCAL LEVEL: NEW CHALLENGES FOR CITIES
2. TERRORISM AT LOCAL LEVEL : NEW CHALLENGES FOR CITIES

Subsequent to the launch of this project, clarification was needed, on one hand on the notion of terrorism, and on the other hand, regarding the local level. Indeed, during the first two conferences, namely in Bristol and Lisbon, we encountered in particular two major difficulties:

1. How to define terrorism?
2. What is the local level?

At the same time, the debate raised by the term “war on terrorists” as a way of fighting terrorism leads to a blunt approach. Indeed, the use of the term “war” in this context refers mainly to a repressive policy, leading to a negative spill-over effect between terrorists and authorities. In this way the debate during the Bristol seminar has reminded us the statement made by the British Government about the risk of fanning the flames on the question by referring to the fight against terrorism as a war. Therefore, the British Government has asked its employees to stop referring to this issue as a war9.

2.1 What is terrorism?

Historically, terrorism describes a system of revolutionary government; “La Terreur”, which raged from September 1792 (the “First Terror”) to July 1794 (the "Big Terror"), which the Thermidorian Convention terminated. The word appears in the 1798 Dictionary of the French Academy (Silvia Ciotti Galetti, 2007). Even though the term appeared at the end of the 18th century, preceding experiences have emerged. For instance, two religious terrorist organisations, the Zealots-Sicarii (1st century) and the Assassins (11th and 12th century) are of particular interest because they were active internationally and highly destructive (Arnaud Blin 2007; Jessica Stern 2003). Even though the Zealots used primitive technology (daggers and swords) to initiate a revolt against the Romans and their imperialism, they carried out murders and devastating actions such as the destruction of the Masada Temple. Later, and for about two centuries, the Assassins pursued and promoted a “pure” version of Islam by murdering crusaders as well as Muslims. We can compare these actions with today’s suicide bombers; they were targeting individuals like politicians and religious leaders, as well as threatening several governments like the Turkish Empire.

Nowadays, the activities of terrorist groups do not seem that different from the activities of the Zealots and Assassins, which were characterised by a return of the holy terror. Moreover, they attack randomly and target innocent people as did their predecessors.

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9 Bristol University’s report, p.5
We must remember that religious terrorism is like any other form of terrorism, being a form of political violence. Indeed, we distinguish terrorism from other modes of violence and conflict\textsuperscript{10}, on the basis of the characteristics formulated by Wilkinson (2006: 1-2):

- it violates the norms regulating disputes, protest and dissent.
- it is premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear.
- it is directed at a wider target than the immediate victims.
- it inherently involves attacks on random or symbolic targets, including civilians.
- it is considered by the society in which it occurs as ‘extra-normal’, that is, in the literal sense that it violates the norms regulating disputes, protest and dissent.
- it is used primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political behaviour of governments, communities or specific social groups”.

Thus, the Zealots’, like the Assassins’ actions are not far way from the twenty-first century terrorist activity. Precisely, what are the characteristics - rather than a definition, of contemporary terrorism? Historically, modern international terrorism is rooted in the emergence of terrorist organisations at the end of the 60s and the early 70s, such as the factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), the Al Fatah, but also the Red Army Faction, the Japanese Red Army, the Red Brigades and also groups with nationalist aims such as the IRA or ETA for example. For those operating in liberal democratic countries, civil liberties, in particular the right of free speech, are a key element to promote their action and consolidate their network. The use of the media is also crucial to create a climate of fear within the population and the international community.

Consequently, countries did not wait until the 9/11 attacks to develop their legal framework, promote international cooperation and promote the prevention and suppression of terrorist crimes. Therefore, national anti-terrorist legislation like international laws on terrorist offences were developed. Nevertheless, very few laws propose a definition of a terrorist act. The focus is mainly on the means to fight terrorism and more precisely about the way to balance repression and prevention policy.

Nevertheless, we could find in the UK legislation Act a definition of terrorism:

(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where:
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

\footnote{10 During the CAT project, we had a debate concerning the category to which a terrorist act belongs. In this report, we consider terrorism as a specific type of crime even though no agreed definition exists. For an alternative view, see for instance the Bristol report, available at http://www.fesu.org}
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it:
(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

Terrorism Act 2000, Part 1, Section “Terrorism: interpretation”

At the international level, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed two important resolutions. Resolution 1373 (2001) reminds the UN’s members of the need to fight collectively against terrorism, whilst the UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004), passed unanimously, declares that in no circumstances can terrorist acts be condoned or excused for political or ideological reasons.

“(…) 3. Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of people or particular people, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.”

The UNSC resolution, like the United Nations’ Charter, was one of the political guidelines for countries’ and other international organisations’ actions after the attacks in the USA (11/9/2001), Great Britain (7/7/2005) and Spain (11/3/2004). Indeed, both documents are a benchmark in the fight against terrorism as they make the issue more international than ever before. Nevertheless, attacks mainly take place in large cities, which transforms the international aspect of terrorism into a local issue too. Indeed, cities are targeted because on the one hand, they symbolise Western civilisation and its modernity, and on the other hand, they have a high population density. Therefore, cities are an ideal target in order to destroy
a system of values and the people making this system work. We will return to this aspect in the next section.

The proposal made by the European Council after the Madrid bombing to introduce a European day commemorating the victims of terrorism confirmed the importance of this question on the international and local political agenda. Moreover, the European Council is creating a direct link between local attacks and global concerns by insisting that any authority worldwide is threatened.

“The European Council, deeply shocked by the terrorist attacks in Madrid, expresses its sympathy and solidarity to the victims, their families and to the Spanish people. The callous and cowardly attacks served as a terrible reminder of the threat posed by terrorism to our society. Acts of terrorism are attacks against the values on which the Union is founded. The Union and its Member States pledge to do everything within their power to combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Union, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations set out under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). The threat of terrorism affects us all. A terrorist act against one country concerns the international community as a whole. There will be neither weakness nor compromise of any kind when dealing with terrorists. No country in the world can consider itself immune. Terrorism will only be defeated by solidarity and collective action. The European Council endorses the proposal of the European Parliament to declare 11 March a European day commemorating the victims of terrorism”

European Council, Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism 10586/04 of June 15th 2004

According to the European Union and the UN, terrorism is a global phenomenon which requires the solidarity of all states and organisations. Consequently, the EU envisages that the fight against terrorism will involve all actors, from heads of government to citizens, including regional and local authorities and likewise associations. The new aspect of terrorism is not so much the phenomenon itself, but the techniques and means used, which have led to a rethinking on the global approach to the war on terror, as stated in the following communication of the Commission addressed both to the Council and the European Parliament:

“The rights to life, freedom and security are among the most cherished – if not the most important - human rights. Terrorism threatens them all. The preservation of those rights is a fundamental task requiring in our democracies the participation of all social actors. Thus, it is not enough that European policies are integrated, they must also be inclusive. They must involve parliaments, economic agents, civil society organisations and
all European citizens. The protection of life, security and freedom requires, in our times, novel solutions, means and approaches. If terrorists are to be denied the use of liberty against liberty itself, the whole of society will need to participate in the definition and the development of new tools and new controls: the more effective tools required to fight global terrorism and the new effective controls required to maintain the balance between collective security and individual freedom. Security objectives must nevertheless remain compatible with the principles of fundamental liberties; and with the international rules on free entrepreneurship and commercial exchanges; the confidentiality of individual and commercial data gathered for the purpose of security services must absolutely be guaranteed in the EU and also by our commercial partners”.


This document highlights two fundamental aspects of the antiterrorist fight for liberal democracies. The first is the necessity to maintain the balance between the level of collective security and the protection of personal liberties. The pursuit of the security objective cannot be made by compromising the freedoms that are fundamental in Western democracies. However, experience shows that the value of this principle can vary from one state to another, and that it varies according to the level of insecurity, both real and perceived by the political class and the citizens.

The second fundamental point concerns more concrete elements of the fight against global terrorism, in terms of the need for new tools and approaches. It does not mean that terrorism is a new phenomenon or that the definition has changed, but simply that it has evolved. On the one hand, international terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda demonstrate a capacity to organise their network in autonomous cells and thus are difficult for the police and intelligence services to detect. On the other hand, the organisation of spectacular attacks opens the door to speculations about the objectives targeted and the weapons the terrorist groups may have (conventional, biological and chemical weapons and nuclear bombs).

Consequently, and without undermining the importance of the theoretical debate on the definition of terrorism, it is the responsibility of the involved people and groups to propose an acceptable answer to the terrorist threat.

The first statement of this research is the observation that the events of 11th September 2001 were a catalyst to introduce or accelerate structural reforms, as we shall see in the next section. In particular, it seems that the role of local actors has increased, for at least two reasons. In the first place, cities which are potential targets are going to become actors in the international system - individually or
via networks - next to States or other international organisations. This evolution concerns the large cities in particular, especially New York, London, Madrid and the other major European capitals. However, to evoke the growing importance of cities, the general role of local actors must also develop. One of first difficulties of this project was to define what the local level is; currently four partner universities have proposed four different definitions corresponding to as many models of organisation of the State (centralised and federal).

2.2 Local authorities: their relevance in facing terrorism

The role of the local level is of crucial importance in the Cities against Terrorism project due to the direct implication of local authorities during a possible terrorist attack, as seen with the examples of London, Madrid or New York. Undoubtedly, cities are a central strategic point for terrorist attacks. According to Arnaud Blin11, “…it is in the city that bomb throwers of all kinds will enact their propaganda by deed and where the terrorist hopes that panic will strike the masses and lead them to revolt. It is also in the cities that political leaders, members of royal families or famous industrialists will fall victim to their attacks…”. Nonetheless, the role of the cities in tackling terrorism is rarely recognised and, consequently, cities often lack sufficient legitimacy and competences to face this threat.

Council of Europe Resolution 159 of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities12 recognises the cities’ important role and asks local authorities in Europe to take a number of detailed steps needed to protect their citizens against terrorist attacks and threats to democracy. Some of the requests formulated by the Congress include:

- formulating polices to foster social cohesion and promote tolerance through educational and cultural programmes;
- encouraging and promoting regular dialogue between different religious faiths;
- taking all necessary steps to protect people in places where they gather and in partnership with specialised agencies and governments;
- fully informing the public about all threats and risks, planned contingency measures and subsequent crisis management (…).13

In examining the role of cities in the fight against terrorism, the analysis that our partner universities have carried out shows clear differences in both action and prevention plans. This in itself is not surprising, as they are the result of

11 Arnaud Blin. Democracy, urbanisation and terrorism – what History can tell us. Project Director for the Foundation Charles- Léopold Mayer (Paris), Researcher at IFAS – Institut Français d’Analyse Stratégique (French Institute of Strategic Analysis) and former Director of the Beaumarchais Centre for International Research (Washington).
13 Ibid. Article 23.
state organisation methods which are unique in each of the studied countries (see 1.4). At this stage, it is useful to emphasise that the aim of the CAT project is not to create a European model for local prevention, but rather to reflect upon introducing in the future a training scheme for local authorities with regards to the fight against terrorism. Beforehand, we must consider the definition of the concept of a “local authority” in order to understand how the differences in local authority practices developed and where they originated.

By definition, a local authority is the smallest political component of a state, and whose political system is completely different from those of the province, region, department, county, prefecture, city or commune. Furthermore, the responsibilities awarded to the local authorities by the state vary widely. In Germany for example, responsibility for interior security is shared between the national government and the Länder. Similarly in Belgium, the police forces fall within the competence of the federal government and directly under that of the mayors. The Polish and Portuguese systems, on the contrary, place the direction of police and security forces involved in prevention under the jurisdiction of the national government, as we shall see in the next section.

Therefore, terrorism at a local level is a very complex issue, as there are as many policies as there are European countries. Of course, police cooperation programmes allow a certain degree of conformity, especially during collaboration whilst organising large sporting events (the football World Cup in Germany) or political events (the European Councils in Brussels), but also after tragic events such as the London and Madrid attacks.

Notwithstanding, local actors impose themselves in the antiterrorist fight despite the roles we would normally consider them fulfilling. For two decades, local politics has been recognised as important in managing public policies, for example by the European Charter for Local Autonomy (art. 3 and 4) of the European Council (1985), ratified by 42 states. Of course, the role of local authorities in the fight against terrorism is a recent concept which has not been fully developed, and although terrorism is a global phenomenon, it is no longer a local issue for the judiciary, the police and above all, the councils, to deal with. However, this new reality has not yet been fully integrated at a governmental level, as demonstrated by the French Government’s white paper on internal security faced with terrorism. The role of local communities is not sufficiently recognised, other than as a link as part of a crisis management plan (Vigipirate Plan in France) or communication (ACROPOL network).

One of the indicators to measure the importance of this issue is the incidence of reform projects in the member states dealing with antiterrorism. In fact, the extent of this problem can serve as a catalyst to launch other reforms (for example
the restructuring of the police forces in France as in Switzerland\textsuperscript{14}) or to accelerate projects launched before September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001, such as in Belgium, where projects began after the political scandal which became known as the Dutroux Affair\textsuperscript{15}.

The main change brought around by the security challenge is on the same lines, and is about better integrating the local dimension and cities within national prevention policies. This change could lead to a greater evolution, by making the large European capital cities new actors in the international system, following the lead of New York, as the symbol as much as the potential leader in the fight against terror. Furthermore, from now on the issue concerns the role and the place of the cities, notably within an inevitably renewed UN system.

Since its creation in 1987, the European Forum for Urban Safety, a non-governmental organisation bringing together nearly three hundred European local authorities, has supported the key-player role of local authorities working in the field of safety. In 2001, the Mayors of the Forum expressed their compassion for the citizens of the United States affected by the attacks on 11\textsuperscript{th} September and demanded mobilisation at all levels, insisting that “Cities have a role to play in the global effort to eliminate terrorism. This role doesn’t involve taking part in a war, but involves fighting to defend the values of democracy”. The Zaragoza Manifesto\textsuperscript{16} constituted an important step in the recognition of the importance for cities in dealing locally with crime and terrorism. To help local elected officials build inclusive and comprehensive policies, EFUS favours the transfer of expertise and the exchange of experiences according to the model of “cities helping cities”.

\textbf{2.2.1 Facing terrorism by the local level: frameworks for action}

The complexity of the local level in Europe, regarding the local authorities’ capabilities, roles and available resources, does not make their involvement easy or straightforward. Four project partners came from different European countries where frameworks for action for local authorities differ mildly or greatly. It is therefore necessary to present the links between local and higher levels in the area of facing terrorism in order to understand the main differences and similarities and identify the potential for the creation of common guidelines for local authorities in Europe.

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14 Interview with Pascal Riat, Special Investigations Branch, Geneva Judiciary Police, Switzerland.
15 During the European Summit of March 8th-9th held in Brussels, we were able to interview Roland Vanreusel, Head of the Brussels-Capital Police Force, and Commissioners Christian De Coninck and Luc Ysebaert on the subject of the security plan launched at this summit.
\end{flushright}
a. The British case

In the UK, there are two types of local government structures: a two-tier structure and a single tier. The two tier structure consists of county councils which provide, amongst other services, education, social services, and emergency planning for the county, and district councils, who provide a range of very localised services such as waste management, community safety, planning, and emergency planning.

The single tier structure consists of unitary councils, metropolitan councils and city councils. These councils have complete control over their service delivery. Funding for providing all council services comes from central government grants and local council taxes/service charges.

In addition to determining what services are required locally, councils are very much driven by central government initiatives either through guidance or legislation. Examples of legislation and guidance can be seen in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Department of Health guidance on Pandemic Flu arrangements, the Home Office and their influence in the Community Safety Agenda, and the Cabinet Office, especially the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. The latter was established to enhance the UK’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies.

In order to deliver a single framework for civil protection in the UK, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 was introduced, after a series of national major incidents e.g. Flooding, the Foot and Mouth outbreak, the Fire Dispute and the Fuel crisis.

The British Crime and Disorder Act (1998) requires (among other things) every local authority department to consider the crime reduction implications of what it does and then to act to maximise the community safety possibilities of its day-to-day services. As terrorism is a crime, there is already a statutory requirement for local authorities and other public agencies, such as the health service, to play their part in preventing it, yet this is rarely integrated explicitly into their strategies. At a national level this separation for tackling terrorism is also apparent in departmental organisation and policy processes.

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17 The following chapter is mainly based on the lecture British Local Authorities experience at prevention of Terrorism given by Spencer Webster at the Katowice seminar and on the basis of the discussion held at the CAT seminar of Bristol. Detailed reports from both seminars are available on http://www.fesu.org (Secutopic Terrorism)

18 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) sits within the Cabinet Office at the heart of central government.

19 Full text of the Civil Contingencies Act can be found on the UK resilience website: http://www.ukresilience.info

20 More detailed analysis of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 can be found under chapter 3.2.1 A multi-agency approach: the British case.
Despite the issues above, local authorities in the UK are doing much work at many levels that, either directly or indirectly, help to prevent and reduce the impact of terrorism. There are huge variations between local authorities in terms of explicit initiatives to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks, but each one is adapted to the local situation. History has shown that capital cities and major metropolitan areas are vastly more at risk than provincial cities and small towns. In the last forty years nearly all terrorist attacks in England have occurred in the inner city area of London; the only exceptions being one attack each in Birmingham and Manchester (the next two largest cities in England) and, surprisingly, an IRA explosion in Saint Helens, Lancashire - a medium sized industrial town.

b. The Portuguese case

In Portugal, law n. 169/99 of September 18th defines the competences of the Portuguese municipalities; it also establishes the legal responsibilities of its organs and civil parishes. Some of the municipalities’ responsibilities may be similar to those of an administrative police; one of their roles is to decide whether to create a police municipal service and the Municipal Council of Security. Furthermore, each Mayor is in charge of, in close collaboration with the National Authority for Civil Protection, the municipal service for civil protection, bearing in mind the required compliance to previously established plans and programmes, and the necessary intervention coordination within civil protection (i.e. assistance operations, with special emphasis on catastrophes or public chaos).

Civil Protection has been mainly connected to emergency management, essentially responding to serious accidents and catastrophes, as recently defined by the Civil Protection Act. Civil Protection addresses and minimises natural and technological dangers and risks that may pose a threat to peoples’ lives and property. It thus not only deals with floods, earthquakes, fires and volcanic eruptions but also with accidents (e.g. industrial accidents, the transportation of dangerous and toxic materials, toxic pollution). It focuses on emergencies and accidents perceived as identifiable and limited. Generally, one knows what to expect within the scope of emergencies: the threats, vulnerabilities and risks are globally identified and well-known; plans and responses are at least partially put in place. The partners intervening in the emergency operations are also known to each other, each being aware of their specific mission and responsibilities.

However, according to Manuel João Ribeiro, the events of 11th September in New York, as well as the bombings on 11th March in Madrid and 7th July in London have caused profound changes to this approach, and not only in Portugal. The concept of crisis is being socially redeveloped as different to the concepts of accident or emergency.

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21 The following chapter is mainly based on the lecture The Civil Protection National Service in Crisis Management given by Manuel Joao Ribeiro at the Lisbon CAT seminar. The report from this seminar is available on http://www.fesu.org (Secutopic Terrorism).

In Portugal, the National Authority for Civil Protection (NACP) is the organisation in charge of directing and supervising the activities of the Fire Departments and coordinating all civil protection and first-aid activities nationally.

The main mission of this national structure, as set out by the Civil Protection Act, is:

- to prevent and minimise risks associated with disasters and reduce their potential effects;
- to coordinate and supervise every operational activity of Portuguese firemen;
- to evaluate studies, projects and plans within the fire prevention area, and to verify and supervise its applicability in loco;
- to manage and coordinate emergency response operations on a national and local level.

Beyond the central services (which integrate a National Command for Emergency Response), the NACP is still formed of 18 District Commands of Emergency Operations (one for each of the 18 districts of the Portuguese mainland). At the municipal level, responsibilities in terms of civil protection are under the jurisdiction of the Mayor. Each municipality must have a municipal service in charge of civil protection capable of organising, preparing, activating and supporting all civil protection interventions.

The NACP, as is the norm for civil protection services on an international level, develops its activities within four areas of intervention:

- prevention (risk analysis, research and supervision of security issues, education, awareness and public awareness);
- preparation (planning tools for organising emergency response to several threats and risks)
- first-aid and emergency (forest and urban fires, accidents, pre-hospital activities, international missions for humanitarian and technical aid)
- rehabilitation (contributing to territorial organisation through supervision of the Territorial Development Plans and of the Municipal Master Plans).

Regarding the real threat and risk of terrorist attacks, it is necessary to acknowledge that this particular area has not historically been a priority for the NACP. Yet, there have been some developments related in particular to simulations and exercises in which the NACP participates; and also, in operational terms, several interventions mainly in the aftermath of 11th September, due to the threat of Anthrax (i.e. White Powder).

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23 Resulting from the merging of three organisations: the National Fire Department Service, the National Service for Civil Protection and the National Commission Specialised in Forest Fires.
Be that as it may, this is an area which has been the responsibility of the police research and security structures and in which the armed forces also play a significant role. Therefore, the question remains if and how the NACP can intervene in this area.

First of all, this is an area of government responsibility. As a result, it makes perfect sense to take advantage of all available resources and means. Secondly, the NACP has reference matrixes which, although not specifically directed to terrorism threats and related issues, may be easily adapted in order to encompass these areas. Thirdly, the need to adapt any policy of intervention centred on the multi-threat concept instead of a specific risk is becoming more and more accepted. Finally, cooperation between all participants needs to be promoted.

As a consequence, in crisis management associated with terrorist threats, the NACP must assume the role of player and partner, with specific responsibilities, and not interfere with other organisations. The NACP can cooperate in the prevention phase, training target populations and promoting public awareness, a domain in which it is widely experienced. It can also contribute to increase the articulation and the coordination of the emergency plans, as well as to make them better complement each other. Simulations and exercises on a national and international level must continue, with a particular emphasis on recognising mistakes and fragilities in order to correct and improve upon them.

c. The Polish case

The legal basis for self-government in Poland was created by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997). According to the law from 1998, reforming territorial division of the State, there are three levels of self-government:

1. **Voïvodeship** - province, a regional unit (currently 16). At this level, self-government is represented by a Marshal and co-exists with the state administration headed by Voïvods, who are representatives of the central government at the regional level. Voïvods are held responsible for carrying out state policies in their Voïvodeship. As a representative of the national government, a Voïvod may also give out directives binding all state administrative bodies, and in emergency situations also binding the local administration body. The Voïvod, as the direct head of the state-integrated administration (such as Police, Fire-departments), directs and coordinates its operation, ensures its effectiveness and is held responsible for its results. He or she is also authorised to act with regard to state non-integrated administration (subordinate directly to the responsible central minister or head of a central

24 The fulfilment of these requirements was the key to the success of the emergency response operations in the aftermath of the London bombings.

25 The following chapter is mainly based on the lecture *Crisis Management and Communication system* given by Grzegorz Kamienowski during the CAT Katowice seminar (full report on http://www.fesu.org) and on the information from the Voïvodship Office of Silesia. http://www.katowice.uw.gov.pl/
office – for example Voïvodeship Health and Epidemiology Service). Based on the terms and covenants of appropriate legislative regulations, the Voïvod supervises the operation of local administration units.

2. **Powiat**, is a unit of territorial organisation smaller than a Voïvodeship, but bigger than basic units, which is known as *gmina*. A Powiat executes the public tasks of cross-borough nature. It maintains and manages schools, libraries and social clubs, supervises road construction and repairs, as well as manages social welfare and fights unemployment. At this level, local administration is exercised by the Powiat Council and the Powiat Board led by the Starost (chief Powiat official).

3. **Gmina** (borough, municipality) – the most basic, local unit of territorial division and self – government. Predominantly, a gmina is responsible for satisfying the primary, essential needs of its inhabitants; it deals with planning and managing land, environment protection, roads, bridges, streets, public transport, supplying the inhabitants with electricity and heating; keeping the area clean, as well as managing and maintaining the borough’s buildings and public facilities.

At present, the system of civil protection in Poland is full of faults and shortcomings, according to Grzegorz Kamienowski. Such a situation results from the reform of public administration, decentralisation of the state and the new reality of the free market economy that has led to the lack of a coherent concept of the fulfilment of tasks related to safety, and the lack of legislation specifying the functioning of that system. Acts or amendments issued *ad hoc* only worsen the situation instead of improving it. A large number of legal acts coming from various periods of time resulted in a lack of coherence.

The nature of tasks carried out on the level of Voïvodeships (the lowest level of central government administration in Poland) is not uniform, and has no leading legal norm, but is based on many legal acts coordinated by the Minister of National Defence (MND) and the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration (MIAA). Within the scope of national defence the tasks are supervised by MND, and within the scope of internal safety they are supervised by MIAA.

In Poland, a Voïvode has some planning documents on the basis of which he/she will carry out tasks relating to crisis management in case of terrorist acts. These documents (discussed in detail in the Crisis Management chapter) include:

- “Operational Plan of Voïvodeship Functioning”;
- “National System of Crisis Emergency”;
- “Crisis Response Plan of the Voïvodeship”;

30
d) The German case  

As a result of the federal structure of the Federal Republic of Germany, the responsibilities and activities within the field of crime prevention are concentrated at the level of the 16 Länder. To address the issues of prevention and cooperation, a Federal State Working Group (Bund-Länder-Projektgruppe; BLPG) was set up in order to act as a task force consisting of deputies from the Federal Government and the governments of the 16 states.

In recent years, public transport systems all around the world have been hit by terrorist attacks. For this reason, the special BLPG dealt with the enhancement of public transport safety. Public transport companies are playing an important role in safety issues. They are especially working in potential “danger-zones” on highways and in train stations. The BLPG pointed out that their employees were trained to handle dangerous situations and stated the usefulness of the current state protection situation. A campaign called “Pay attention whilst travelling” (“Aufmerksam unterwegs”) was developed in order to make passengers, as well as employees, aware of abandoned pieces of luggage. The German states implemented the results of the BLPG at a state and local level.

Furthermore, a co-operation agreement between the police and the association of private security companies (“Bundesverband Deutscher Wach- und Sicherheitsunternehmen”) was set up. It was considered important that the state authorities work together with private security companies to enhance preventive measures in order to prevent terrorism in Germany.

Representatives from all local levels in Germany are obliged to prepare and take steps to minimise on the one hand the immediate terrorist threat, and on the other hand the negative effects of an attack.

On January 1st 2002, the new counter-terrorism law became effective in Germany and a new legal basis was created by extending the reasons for expulsion of people from so-called “rogue nations”. The classification of those nations was determined by administrative regulations of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Department for Foreign Affairs. Now identity-securing measures, e.g. the collection of biometrical data and voice recordings, are possible. In addition, it is possible to co-operate with other agencies in visa procedures for people from “rogue states”, if there are any reasons why a visa would not be granted.

According to the modified residence law, foreign citizens can now be expelled if they violate the Constitution (Grundgesetz), if they threaten state security, if the person belongs to (or supports) a terrorist organisation and/or takes part in

26 The following chapter is mainly based on the lectures given by Wilfried Blume-Beyerle and Gottfried Stömer during the CAT Tübingen seminar (full report on http://www.fesu.org)
politically motivated acts of violence. Also, crimes against peace or humanity, attempting to recruit others to a terrorist group or agitation are valid reasons to expel someone. If foreigners do not leave the country voluntarily or cannot be expelled, extensive monitoring measures can be arranged which substantially limit the zone of action of the concerned people. Foreigner authorities are responsible for the execution of the measures. The counter-terrorism law was put in action by a specialised working group of the foreigner authority in Munich. Since March 2003, 20,000 security questionings have been held by local authorities. 2,000 cases were examined by other security authorities.

In the context of the working group BIRGIT (identification and feedback of dangerous people from the range of the Islamic terrorism groups - Beschleunigte Identifizierung und Rückführung von Gefährdern aus dem Bereich des islamistischen Terrorismus/Extremismus) new forms of co-operation between authorities are being developed. The aim of this working group is the expulsion of dangerous Islamic people and/or to limit their scope of action through applying the current law as far as possible. Regarding the afore-mentioned counter-terrorism law, working groups like BIRGIT have the opportunity to cooperate strongly and effectively with the foreigner authorities, the police and constitution authorities. Throughout Bavaria, the working group BIRGIT worked on over 60 individual cases - almost all of them resulted in the expulsion of dangerous people. The consistent application of the current laws led to the fact that all observed followers of the group Ansar al Islam had to leave Munich. This “Bavarian model”, which is based on detailed questionings and an intensive co-operation with the security authorities, has since been introduced by the other states of the Federal Republic.

2.2.2 The fight against terrorism: the value of experience

The importance of a terrorist threat depends on whether the target is a capital city, a cosmopolitan area, a city located next to strategically important installations (an oil tanker terminal, a nuclear power station, a dam etc.), or a small town. To this we must add the variable of history, as cities in countries with a history of fighting terrorism are theoretically better prepared to confront such threats. In the same way, the role of the local level within the state represents an as important variable, as depending on whether a federal or centralised state is the target, the capabilities of the local authorities will vary greatly. In this context, the combination of these three factors - the profile of the city, experience, and the state structure – explains the large differences between local anti-terrorist measures, something which makes the development of a “European Model” even more difficult. This issue, which we will return to throughout this report, does not mean that it isn’t possible to form guidelines for European local authorities with regards to the fight against terrorism. In fact, we have identified initiatives carried out by local authorities or police forces within our partner universities’ countries which could be reproduced in other communities. The creation of these guidelines must not however mask
reality, by distinguishing between countries that can benefit from experience in dealing with the fight against terrorism and countries who have fortunately never suffered terrorist attacks. These experiences at a national level form an important basis for local authorities to develop their own anti-terrorist policies, by using directives developed nationally or by developing new tools.

The UK and Germany are the only states represented amongst our partner universities to have experienced terrorist attacks. The British example is certainly more eventful, on the one hand caused by its colonial past, and on the other by its management of the Northern Ireland situation. In the first case, the British authorities had to deal with independency movements in their colonies after World War 2, most notably in Palestine and Crete where exceptional local terrorist attacks affected the whole of the country, calling for an end to British rule. However, it is rare for terrorists’ demands to be met, especially when they demand an occupying force to leave. Of course, exceptional conditions led to this situation; on the one hand the anti-colonial movements benefited from high political and logistical support from the population, and on the other, the British saw their colonial power contested and thus lost their legitimacy. The post-colonial period in general turned terrorism into an auxiliary army in the hands of hostile forces, but reducing terrorism in this form is not possible, as shown in part 2.1. The anti-colonial movements in Palestine and in Crete were a specific form of terrorism, which could be described as “historical terrorism” as opposed to modern day terrorism, which is better illustrated by the situation in Northern Ireland (Wilkinson 2006: 20-26). Specifically, terrorism in Northern Ireland symbolised the British fight against terrorism, and it set a precedent for the emergence of modern terrorism. In fact, and as Alan Greer reminds us, the terrorist threat for the last 50 years in the UK came from the IRA, and not from an Islamic group. However, after the attacks on July 7th and 21st 2005, as well as the failed attacks on June 29th 2007 in the capital and June 30th at Glasgow Airport, the threat has changed, now in the form of Islamic groups. In fact, and according to Judge Justice Fulford, who was in charge of the case which sentenced each of the bombers from the failed July 21st bombings to 40 years each in prison, these recent attacks are undoubtedly connected to those of July 7th. In both cases, the attacks were, according to the judge, planned and controlled by Al-Qaeda. In this context, it is worthwhile considering transferring the experience gained by British authorities in Northern Ireland to the current fight against terrorism in Europe.

According to Alan Greer, and despite the differences in this context, there are similarities to be made between the situation in Northern Ireland and the situation

29 Mukhtar Ibrahim, Yassin Omar, Ramzi Mohammed and Hussain Osman
of nationalist separatist groups, such as in the Basque Country in Spain. Even when the aims of a terrorist group are not linked to creating a state or recognising a nation, for example the attacks in London and Madrid, the success of managing the Irish crisis is still clearly useful. To judge the options taken in Ireland, it is important to take into account the political culture in Northern Ireland, both on the Republican and Loyalist sides, with violence being a constant factor in the Northern Ireland problem. The resolution of this conflict rightfully led to factors being analysed to see if they can be used in the current fight against terrorism.

Over all, it is in the prevention policies that there are similarities which have helped resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland, and in particular these three areas:

1. Identifying social needs

The British experience in Ulster has for example highlighted social needs as varied as building leisure centres and guaranteeing civil rights. In the first case, there had to be a higher number of leisure centres in all community development zones within the UK. In the second case, the government scheme looked to better take into account demands in terms of civil rights to the local authorities from the catholic minority.

2. Education

This is a key theme in the fight against terrorism and which is definitely going to become more important at the same time that the prevention policy model will. The educational reform during the conflict in Northern Ireland insisted upon having catholic and protestant children together in the same classes, so that the separation and segregation culture would not be able to infiltrate schools.

3. Communication and dialogue

The Northern Ireland experience showed the importance of maintaining dialogue and communication between the different sides, even when no official negotiation was in progress. Ensuring regular contact, even if only official, was essential in preserving the chances of ending the conflict. The context of modern terrorism which governments and local authorities currently face does not have however a history, unlike in Northern Ireland, where two opposing sides were clearly identified: the IRA on one side and the British authorities on the other. Operating in autonomous cells, modern terrorism has many faces. It is difficult to hold dialogue between the authorities and these movements, as the structure of the latter, like their members, changes rapidly. In other words, the potential similarities with the Irish example concern more social dialogue and communication with the communities from where terrorists originate than direction dialogue in the form of negotiation with the people directly involved. What’s more, when a terrorist group’s objectives are international and not limited to one country or region (demand for independence for example), such as Al-Qaeda’s attacks against
Western values, all communication policies should be on the same level. For the local authorities, communication could become more complex, as it will need to be in contact with areas designated by the government and may have special roles to fulfil. It is therefore more in terms on intercommunity dialogue (prevention policy) than negotiating (reaction policy) that the experience from Northern Ireland will be used.

Generally speaking, we can therefore consider that the positive outcome of the situation in Northern Ireland constitutes an important element in creating an anti-terrorist approach in the UK. However, the specific characteristics of modern terrorism, on the one hand its religious element (Islam for example), and on the other hand the unknown targets, mean that any modification of the crisis management ‘model’ used in Northern Ireland for the current situation must be balanced. The British law system evolved specifically to confront this new challenge, by passing anti-terrorist legislation in 2000 (The British Terrorist Act, amended in 2006), which loosely defines modern terrorism, including politically, religious and ideologically motivated terrorism. But it was in 2004 when a benchmark law was introduced with the “Civil Contingencies Act 2004” which instructed local authorities to create plans in case of a terrorist attack, something which caused both logistical and financial problems. But it is above all in terms of structure where the differences between innovative and non-innovative cities become apparent. In Portugal for example, the NACP, which is now in charge of anti-terrorist measures, originally organised and supervised civil protection activities and first aid as part of a nationwide plan. After the September 11th attacks, the new responsibility of dealing with anti-terrorist measures was handed to the NACP; despite the emergence of a terrorist threat in Europe, as new as it was, no new institutions were created to deal with it. It is essentially a policy of reallocating available resources which characterises city policies in this field, not excluding the creating or launching of new initiatives in the areas of prevention or communication.

In Germany, the only federal state represented in the CAT project, we have previously seen that the 16 Lander are in the wider sense at the centre of the prevention and co-operation systems. Forming guidelines is one of the responsibilities of a task force, the BLPG, which from now on include the fight against terrorism, similar to Portugal. Nevertheless, following the anti-terrorist legislation of 2002, a specific approach has been introduced, which on the one hand increases security levels for people leaving or entering the country, and on the other hand works with local authorities to monitor individuals classified as potentially dangerous (BIRGIT Programme). This element, whose effectiveness was demonstrated through its observation of the Munich cell, has also served as a model for the other Lander. Therefore it is not only the experience of the state in the fight against terrorism, but also the experience of bodies within the state, such as the Lander of Bavaria, which could form a model for other European regions.
The example of Poland illustrates another aspect of this history variable, linked not only to a lack of precise terrorist threats, but also to the youthfulness of Polish democracy. Firstly, although Poland participates actively in the international fight against terrorism, notably sending soldiers as part of a multinational force to Iraq (like the UK and Portugal), Poland, and thus its cities, appear nevertheless to be less exposed to a terrorist attack than the UK. Secondly, and importantly, Poland is a young democracy which did not have to face the threat of terrorism whilst it was part of the Soviet Bloc, whose civil protection system is still being modified, with a legal system and control of operations in the hands of the government (Ministries of Defence, Interior and Administration). Although there is a plan in case of crisis situations for the local authorities, this is still theory rather than practice.

The value of this varied history which allows the most innovative cities to plan prevention policies as much as crisis situation plans on current issues must however be put into perspective. Firstly, joint projects between the different people involved in managing the problem of terrorism at a European level (authorities, police, the judiciary, advisors) are becoming more and more developed, operating as a way to exchange important expertise in this field. For example, police co-operation (EU art. 29 and 30), customs co-operation (art 135 of the European Commission), the Schengen Agreements and the creation of Europol (1995) all offer the European Union member states a sufficient framework to promote exchanging experiences at a European level. Secondly, events such as the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, as well as large cultural events (World Exposition) and sporting events (World Cup) represent other occasions, sometimes tragic, for European experts to learn from, exchange experiences on and debate.

Informative meetings for representatives of European police forces after the London attacks demonstrated practices to deal with terrorism that could be reproduced throughout Europe, and not only in the wake of tragic events. Presented as a global problem, terrorism can no longer be seen as a local problem which needs national support to counter the issue. Therefore, with a lack of experience on the national level, some countries are currently using dialogue to present their anti-terrorist policy and to involve local communities within their approach. This was also the aim of this project: to present the reality of the local dimension of terrorism to European specialists in order to raise awareness and to better understand and define the role of local communities in the fight against terrorism.
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM: FROM COOPERATION TO PARTNERSHIP
3. PREVENTION OF TERRORISM: FROM COOPERATION TO PARTNERSHIP

3.1 Prevention and communication

Preventing terrorism in European countries is an issue which is constantly changing, as authorities do not only use crime prevention tools, but they are also developing their own unique instruments, especially in the area of intercommunity dialogue. Broadly speaking, the guidelines for prevention policies for local authorities to follow come from the Council of Europe’s convention from 16th May 2005\(^{31}\), which is based around two main areas (art. 2). Firstly, it emphasises training the repressive services (police forces), and secondly it highlights the development of prevention policies, which also affects education, culture, public information, the media and public awareness. Acting as a compliment to the repressive measures, prevention policies have become a key element in the antiterrorist fight, and even more so in our multicultural societies where the link between political authorities and civil society must be strengthened.

Similarly, and without forming a sub-category for prevention policies, communication is a critical element which promotes on the one hand learning what we would call “living together” in the medium and long term, and on the other hand, informing the citizens of events during possible terrorist attacks. With these two notions being interdependent, we will deal with them as one.

3.1.1 Prevention rather than reaction

Prevention policies cover so many elements which are as different as they are complementary, and which notably include information, infiltration, and social and intercommunity dialogue. By focusing on the medium and long term, these schemes are trying to find the origins of terrorism, which lead individuals to commit attacks, and for some, to do this knowing they will die. As Henry Shaftoe underlines\(^{32}\), resorting to so called repressive actions, which he calls the threat of punishment, is not only insufficient, but has not been seen to be effective. The creation of tighter laws in the United States\(^{33}\) as in Europe, which aim to dissuade any terrorist activities, are mostly symbolic actions intending to illustrate that the authorities are involved in this fight. On the other hand, by stigmatising a certain part of the population, this approach may lead to the opposite effect of the one initially researched, in alienating more than promoting cooperation with groups whose roles are essential in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, the convictions of one of the terrorists behind the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Zacarias Moussaoui, and of Abu Hamza in the UK for inciting murder whilst preaching at


\(^{33}\) Henry Shaftoe, ibidem, p. 9.
Finsbury Park Mosque, were based on old legislation and not on the antiterrorist laws that were recently adopted in these two countries. In this context, if dissuasion, as implemented by the legal system, continues to be an important part of the fight against terrorism, it must be complimented by a prevention policy aiming on the one hand to reduce the opportunities to organise terrorist activities (situation prevention), and on the other hand, eradicating all motivation for people to take part in these activities (social prevention). The idea of improving prevention as part of the fight against terrorism is not contested by any government, quite the reverse, but it’s at the level where the measures are implemented where the issue is important. Although the methods used come from crime prevention, do they not have a lot in common with the fight against terrorism? The experts who took part throughout the duration of the project were not in agreement on this issue. Whilst recognising the characteristics of modern terrorism and which were underlined in the introduction, a terrorist act is according to them, above all a criminal act which justifies employing methods that are used as part of crime prevention. Although we do not need to recognise our dependence on current and past crime prevention practices, it is however necessary to recognise that groups organised in networks or the religious dimension of contemporary terrorism lead to specific approaches. For example, with regards to intercommunity dialogue, Mounir Azzaoui recalls that the simple fact of initiating a dialogue between representatives of different Muslim associations together at the German National Muslim Council and the German authorities may be a source of tension within this community, which is far from being a homogenous one. As although the German authorities’ approach is not fed by a specific suspicion of the Islamic community, the members of this community could feel betrayed by their own representatives by the simple fact that they took part in a dialogue. The explication lies in the international character of the antiterrorist fight. German support for the American intervention in Iraq for some German Muslims “discredited” the German authorities. Consequently, any groups appearing to work with the German authorities is a politically sensitive issue as much for officials as for members of the Muslim community. In this context, prevention policy must take into consideration this international dimension, even when the action is taking place locally. In this way, the risk of stigmatising the Muslim community may potentially be higher when programmes involving intercommunity dialogue do not sufficiently take into account the political character and even the identity of the fight against terrorism.

This example allows us to tackle the main objective of prevention: what are the reasons which lead a person or a group to commit a terrorist act, and what are the factors which will allow us to establish a terrorist’s profile? In other words, what direction should prevention schemes take?

34 He was spokesman for the German National Muslim Council until December 2006 and took part as an expert during conferences organised as part of the CAT project (Tübingen and Brussels).
a. Who are the terrorists?

Answering this question is complicated as there are no standard terrorist profiles. The case of the four British citizens behind the attacks in London on 7th July 200536 illustrates this statement perfectly, especially the supposed leader of the group, Mohammed Sidique Khan. A British citizen born in Leeds to Pakistani parents, his profile shows a person perfectly integrated into society, who had not suffered racism, nor religious indoctrination during his time at school, according to his close friends37. His involvement in terrorism, as his profile gave no indications of it, shows the difficulty that prevention policies face, as it is impossible to create a typical profile of a terrorist.

Nonetheless, and as Jean-Claude Salomon underlines38, there are some elements which allow us to develop a few ideas on the one hand regarding situations which give rise to terrorist activities and on the other hand on the terrorists themselves. Beforehand, we must take one thing into account: we must not forget terrorists’ apparent “normality”, in the sense that they are individuals within our society, even if they are completely against its values. This is precisely one of the main conclusions of Jessica Stern’s research which interrogated religious terrorists (Christians, Jews and Muslims) in prison in Lebanon, Pakistan and the United States. Their main motivation was trying to impose new moral, political and religious rules on the rest of the world by devoting their lives, whilst continuing with their normal lives within their community39.

This concept of terrorists’ apparent normality must be taken into consideration before developing any prevention policy aiming to identify factors leading individuals to commit terrorist attacks. In this way, Jean-Claude Salomon has formed a list of key points which will help us to better understand the typical terrorist’s profile. We have reproduced the main elements of this as part of an analytical guide aimed at local authorities:

- the violence of terrorists is simply more focused and organised than that of youths engaged in urban violence or crime. The root causes are basically the same.
- the goals are symbolic as well as political/religious, identity or ethnic issues.
- terrorists are the same as you and I, with the same basic needs, emotions, feelings and aspirations.
- terrorists are not mad, insane or suffering from pathological disorders though some may be suffering from the results of past PTSD or personality disorders.

36 Mohammed Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay, Hasib Mir Hussain.
37 Suicide Bombers’ Profile, BBC News website (www.news.bbc.co.uk), 30th April 2007.
38 The Mind of the Terrorist presentation from the 1st CAT Project seminar at the University of Bristol, 28th-29th September 2006.
- terrorists are the result of three factors; individual, organisational and environmental.
- one has to take into strong account several key words which explain in part terrorist personality; identification, self esteem, revenge, frustration, reaction, renown, disaffection, challenge, honour, anger, grievances, conflict, resentment.
- today’s terrorists do not function in a vacuum or alone but rather are part of networks.
- terrorist networks are living organisms fuelled by group dynamics.
- networking is the key to the difference between terrorists and urban violence or some criminal activity.
- from selection, through recruitment training preparation and committing attacks, the network is the key.

Amongst the points which seem essential, the diversity of people involved in organising an attack is crucial. In fact, it is not only the bombers who form part of a terrorist network. Recruiting members for the network, launching the network, financing it, then organising and finally carrying out the attack all require very different skills, which makes the task of prevention all the more difficult. Another difficulty is that attacks may be committed by people who are not national residents and who are merely staying in the country as they organise the attack. This was the case with the attacks on the two trains in Dortmund and Koblenz (31st July 2006), in which five Libyans, a Syrian and only two German nationals were involved. Consequently, a prevention policy or policies must take into account all of these particularities and respond accordingly.

The problem facing local authorities is thus dual:

1. they must have the necessary expertise to confront all the demands of modern terrorism;
2. the diversity of preventative actions requires excellent coordination between all agents involved, be they in the same organisation (horizontal cooperation), or at other levels of the State or with foreign partners (vertical cooperation).

Moreover, this is not unique to prevention policy, but is relevant to all areas affected by the fight against terrorism on the local scale (crisis management, intercommunity dialogue and victim support). This is precisely one of the project’s main conclusions, as the fight against terrorism on the local scale acts as a catalyst for the authorities to modify and/or reform the legal framework, which the fight against terrorism forms part of, in order to allow cooperation between the people concerned and therefore to legitimise their action in the communities.

40 Report from the 4th CAT Project seminar at the University of Tübingen, 27th-28th November 2006, pg.19-20.
b. People involved in prevention

Recognising the multidimensional character of the fight against terrorism requires expanding the range of people involved in prevention policies, which will in turn create greater organisational challenges. To understand the complexity of the situation, Henry Shaftoe⁴¹ has developed a diagram based on the British example and which is composed of 3 concentric circles that show influences on terrorists as much as different levels of preventative action.

The first influence circle which leads to terrorists’ changes in behaviour and attitudes is the community sphere, which is primarily composed of family and friends. The second circle groups together the general range of services that local authorities provide (education, health, security, police), religious leaders as well as associations working on social issues. The action of these groups is basic in terms of long term preventative action. Finally, the last circle is of an international nature, as it involves the national and international intelligence networks, central government, local representatives, security services as well as the European Commission.

If the relevancy of the local level in the fight against terrorism is not disputed, its role in prevention appears fundamentally linked, depending on each local situation, to a range of people, as the previous diagram clearly illustrates. In the British example, this link should be stronger as local authorities have had since 1998 a legal obligation following the development of the Crime and Disorder Act. This demands that they, as well as other public services (health for example), strengthen their crime prevention action, which can be linked to terrorism. In reality, the concept of implementing preventative actions to reduce the risk of terrorism exists at the national level, but is still rare at the local level. This does not mean that local authorities do not take prevention measures, but frameworks especially devoted to the fight against terrorism on the local level are generally lacking outside of the large urban areas. It’s essentially in London, Birmingham and Manchester where such preventative measures exist, as this is where previous IRA attacks have taken place during the last forty years.

The role of history in the fight against terrorism is clearly an important element, as not only is the past a source of information regarding certain prevention policies, but above all history reminds us that the past is still relevant to the current situation, since this phenomenon has unfortunately always existed, as Adam Roberts emphasises.

c. The co-operational partnership as a basis for prevention

Prevention requires a political approach which is aimed at the areas involved in its field of action. In other words, assigning responsibilities to one type of person is no longer possible, it is instead necessary to see prevention as cooperation between the different people involved at the local and national levels. Notwithstanding there is an obstacle to carrying this out, or rather the feasibility of carrying this out, as how each country is politically organised varies greatly— from French centralism to German federalism. Therefore the local level’s role in prevention and in particular in the fight against terrorism is also very variable. Nevertheless, we have been able to observe within this programme several initiatives which confirm prevention policies’ potential to acquire a strong co-operational character.

In Germany\textsuperscript{46}, a working group comprising representatives of the national government and of the 16 Länder was created by the national government (Bund-Länder-Projektgruppe, BLPG), in order to discuss the risk of the terrorist threat to public transportation. Protecting transport infrastructure has become even more critical after the attacks in Madrid and London. The aim of the BLPG is to discuss three important factors of prevention:

1. identifying potential dangers within the German motorway network;
2. providing state employees (bus, train and underground drivers especially) with training on how to respond to terrorist attacks;
3. launching an information campaign entitled \textit{Aufmerksam unterwegs} (Pay attention when travelling), principally in order to make passengers as well as employees aware of abandoned luggage.

The results of this working group were introduced at the national level as well as at the local level, i.e. the Länder, as part of a top-down approach. The presence of representatives of the Länder's governments illustrates this transfer between the two levels of the German political system, but also symbolises the recognition of the crucial role that local authorities will play from now on in the fight against terrorism.

On the other hand, the bottom-up approach of the Bavarian authorities\textsuperscript{47} was based on a new federal law introduced as part of the fight against terrorism in order to strengthen the identification of individuals qualified as potentially dangerous in Islamic networks. This very specific prevention policy was developed by a working group known as “BIRGIT” (Beschleunigte Identifizierung und Rückführung von Gefährdern aus dem Bereich des islamistischen Terrorismus/Extremismus), which brought together different local people involved in the fight against terrorism (the police and the local authorities). In practice, this group evaluated the profile of 60 individuals considered dangerous, before the majority of them were deported from Germany, as part of the measures of the aforementioned law. One of the most visible results was the removal of members of the Islamic group Ansar from Munich. This example, known as the “Bavarian model” by the German national authorities, allowed cooperation to be developed on the local level with people involved in identifying Islamists considered to be dangerous. It was also a prevention model for the other German Länder with regards to one form of religious terrorism, of which some adopted the BIRGIT working group’s methods.

The political context in Britain is very different as the role of the authorities isn’t made clear, making any form of cooperation more difficult. Therefore, responsibility for prevention lies between community safety units and emergency planning units. Co-ordinating prevention activities between these two departments

\textsuperscript{46} Gerald Störmer, \textit{Police terrorism prevention in the state of Hesse on the local level}, presented during the 4\textsuperscript{th} CAT Project seminar, at the University of Tübingen, 27\textsuperscript{th}-28\textsuperscript{th} November 2006.

\textsuperscript{47} Report from the 4\textsuperscript{th} CAT project seminar at the University of Tübingen, 27\textsuperscript{th}-28\textsuperscript{th} November 2006, pg. 24-28.
was opportune during the debates held during the CAT project seminars. In fact, the former is in direct contact with the public whilst the latter has greater technical expertise with regards to prevention. In the same way, terrorist prevention policies need to be integrated within a local security strategy, in the image of the initiatives led by Westminster\textsuperscript{48}, or the Borough of Halton\textsuperscript{49}. It is in this way that the Borough of Halton developed a “co-operational partnership”, involving all of the local actors, in order to develop a local security strategy. In addition, this forms one of the few examples of plans implemented on the local level in England, with the exception of prevention programmes developed in the large urban areas.

3.1.2 A comprehensive communication strategy

Communication is a tool in the fight against terrorism which features two distinct aspects. The first concerns informing the public, be it in case of an attack or more generally regarding prevention. The second concerns the transfer of information between people directly involved in the fight against terrorism. In so much as communication will be moulded to the areas that the fight against terrorism covers, the development of a global communication strategy requires beforehand that all antiterrorist measures, from prevention to intercommunity dialogue, are well coordinated.

The difficulty in creating a global strategy comes from a lack of coordination between the different people involved in the fight against terrorism, the effects of which are directly felt in the creation of communication policies. In the same way, and so that communication remains intelligible for both local authorities and the public, broadcasters/journalists should be easily identifiable (who communicates?) and the content of the messages understandable and homogenous (among the broadcasters). By taking into account the requirements of the content (the consistency of information) and the form (coordination between everyone involved in the fight against terrorism), a communication strategy may be formed.

a. Developing a homogenous information system for the general public

For several years, travellers at airports and railway stations have generally been aware of abandoned pieces of luggage. This results from communication developed by authorities in Europe as in most countries in order to foil any attempts of “booby-trap suitcases”, as we recently saw in Germany with the BLPG. This general transformation of passengers and citizens into watch dogs is moreover supported by the European countries themselves, who have increased security (especially at airports), imposed biometric passports, and introduced systematic checking of passengers and their luggage, which itself has become the object of stricter and stricter rules.

\textsuperscript{48} John Baradell and Dean Ingedew, \textit{working together in partnership to prevent the emergence of the threat of terrorism}, paper presented during the 1\textsuperscript{st} CAT project at the University of Bristol, 28\textsuperscript{th}-29\textsuperscript{th} September 2006.

\textsuperscript{49} Spencer Webster, \textit{British local authorities’ experience at prevention of terrorism}, paper presented during the 1\textsuperscript{st} CAT Project Seminar at the University of Bristol, 28\textsuperscript{th}-29\textsuperscript{th} September 2006.
Crossing a border, or rather going from one security zone to another (due to the Schengen Agreements), is becoming an easy way for people to see and compare the levels of security and thus the potential degree of the threat. This example clearly illustrates how a security approach, and the information policy which accompanies it, can contribute to defining individuals’ feelings of security or insecurity. It is crucial for authorities that communication does not produce the opposite effect to the one researched, in particular the feeling of security resulting from prevention and not the inverse. Homogenous information, i.e. the guarantee that the information sources (authorities, organisations etc.) are sending out the same message, is important. Notwithstanding, a message may be adapted and thus be different from the general message when authorities try to target a particular group.

During a simulation of a terrorist attack in a shopping centre presented as part of the CAT project, Richard Flynn tackled the issue of a targeted communication policy aimed at shop managers. Choosing this particular group of the public was justified by the fact that shopping centres represent potential targets, which need to be protected, without the response measure transforming them into war zones. In this way, shop managers become part of the security approach on the one hand by being on the lookout for suspect packages, and on the other hand by knowing the protocol to follow in case of an attack (first aid, gathering injured people together for example). In this way, communication is specially formed to accompany this prevention policy for shop managers.

Notwithstanding, targeted communication must conform with information released to the whole of the community. Communication at the heart of the country, principally between the local and national level, must also be coherent. The simulation of an attack in a shopping centre revealed this problem of coherence, as if the instructions given to shop managers lead him/her to develop a sense of paranoia, this may in turn be noticeable to their customers, and then spread amongst the public. The importance of consistent information is crucial, as this will allow the public to be made aware of potential indicators of the terrorist threat (suspect packages, etc.), without creating widespread panic. This aspect is even more visible after an attack or an attempted attack where fear generated locally spreads to the whole country.

Consistent information is even more important when it targets a religious or ethnic group, unlike the previous example of shop managers. As Mounir Azzaoui recalled, the simple fact of bringing together representatives from the German Muslim community and representatives from the authorities does not mean that...

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50 Richard Flynn, National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), *Simulation exercise - a terrorist attack in a crowded place*, film shown during the 1st CAT project seminar held at the University of Bristol, 28th-29th September 2006. NaCTSO has developed guides bringing together different measures to ensure security in busy public places, such as stadiums, pubs, clubs and tourist attractions (website: www.nactso.gov.uk).
the former can be suspected of being potential terrorists by the latter. In this case, a nationally developed communication strategy is politically sensitive, as it must show the government’s desire for intercommunity dialogue to be strengthened without stigmatising the concerned community. When local authorities adopt this strategy, they must respect the guidelines so that the content remains consistent and the coherence of the prevention policy is guaranteed.

Ensuring that information is consistent between people involved in the fight against terrorism is as important as the information aimed at the public. It is mainly in crisis management and victim support that this aspect appears to be fundamental, as the effects may directly affect people’s lives. As for crisis management, contradictory information may lower the effectiveness of any action taken, for example by being poorly adapted to the actual situation. Regarding victim support and especially help for families, it is critical that information can be easily accessed and that this information has been checked, so that we can avoid initially difficult situations from becoming even more tragic. For the people on the front line, the issue of consistent information is fundamentally linked to the communication approach in operation and to the coordination between everyone involved.

b. An information system coordinated by all involved actors

Communication is at the heart of contemporary democracy and is definitely one of its symbols, built around the ideal of unity between individuals, and conceived as a catalyst for multiculturalism. The large number of high tech communication systems and above all their easy access to the public, has allowed us to naively imagine a way of developing new forms of solidarity. In reality, Dominique Wolton51 underlines that this permanent technological revolution has only created a digital gap between the richest and poorest regions on the planet. Above all, he notes that the positive aspects attributed to communication techniques are made at the cost of the humanist dimension. The result is, according to Wolton, that even the actors stand back from the hi-tech aspects of communication. This is precisely the issue of a comprehensive communication strategy within the fight against terrorism; there needs to be coordination between everyone involved and between all techniques used.

Coordinating information leads us to consider firstly people involved in communication, who are in reality the main actors in the fight against terrorism. These include people working for state services (policemen, fire-fighters, doctors), political authorities, teachers, and leaders of political or religious communities. Each of these people at their own level plays a key role with regards to the information that they pass on, be it as the source of the information or as the relay. As for prevention policies, we have already underlined the importance of integrating the representatives of foreign communities, as seen in particular projects carried out in Germany or

Britain. In this case, it is more important to focus on their networks - on the one hand, to pass on in a co-ordinated manner messages aimed at reducing conflict when there is internal and intercommunity tension - and on the other hand, to spread information which can help those responsible for fighting against terrorism.

Coordinating information between different actors was one of the elements developed following the London attacks in July 2005. According to John Strutton\textsuperscript{52}, the tragic attacks on the London underground renewed the need for greater crisis management reactions in the short term, but also in the longer term with the aim of prevention. A London transport (Transport for London, TfL) study group created at the end of 2005 defined priority actions that need to be carried out, depending on each short and long term aim in the three key areas: getting involved on the ground, education and managing the urban environment.

For TfL, communication appears both as an educational objective, i.e. raising passengers’ awareness of suspect packages, but also as an objective linked to the urban environment. For the latter, the priority is to achieve greater compatibility between the TfL, the police and key actors’ communication systems, in other words, guaranteeing better coordination. Considering the media in this approach is vital in order to guarantee consistent and coordinated information as part of the fight against terrorism. In fact, the impact of media information on the public can not only help to strengthen or decrease a feeling of insecurity, but it can also promote a limited view of terrorism, especially when members of foreign communities are involved. The creation of purely local information centres which will broadcast information through decentralised bodies, will allow content and to a certain extent access to information to be controlled, be it for the public or the media. This is in fact one of the results from the project led by the NGO Impact in the Netherlands, showing the importance of specialised information centres\textsuperscript{53}.

The creation of a comprehensive communication strategy for the fight against terrorism must therefore rest on this dual requirement of information having a homogenous character and all groups involved in the information system coordinating. Consequently, a coordinated approach to the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite to the development of an integrated information system which will form the basis of a comprehensive communication strategy.

3.2 Crisis management

The cities can also undergo crises caused not only by terrorist acts, but also by social phenomena or natural disasters, forcing cities and local governments to place prevention, mitigation and adaptation at the centre of their local security plans in

\textsuperscript{52} John Strutton, *The effects of the London bombings on transport safety*, report presented during the 1st CAT project seminar at the University of Bristol, 28th-29th September 2006.

order to proactively manage risk. Foreseeing crisis management and disaster risk reduction becomes a high priority not only in national, but also in local policies, which should be consistent with the capacities and the resources available.

In different European countries, resilience after disasters can be developed in various ways, but the most effective methods would probably include: people-centred early warning systems, and risk assessments and other integrated, multi-sector approaches within the disaster reduction cycle, which consist of prevention, preparation, emergency responses, as well as recovery and rehabilitation.

Should, however, the threat of an urban crisis situation such as a natural disaster be tackled by local authorities by the same methods and following the same legal procedures as a terrorist attack?

Nowadays, different European and international organisations have a tendency to make a clear distinction between global crises such as natural disasters and terrorism. Consequently, emergency responses, responsibilities, capabilities, and limitations of interventions during times of natural disasters and terrorism acts are discussed and analysed in separate sessions.

The local authorities, nevertheless, do not have at their disposal different sets of human, financial or logistical resources that can be mobilised on the one hand in case of natural disasters and acts of urban violence, and on the other hand in case of terrorist attacks. The examples below present differences in approaches applied by the countries of the project partners.

### 3.2.1 A Multi agency approach: the British example

Integrated emergency management, (IEM), has been in use in the UK for many years. This concept allows for a multi agency approach to emergency planning which anticipates, assesses, prevents, prepares, responds, and recovers from all type of incidents. It’s an all hazards approach. This concept allows for the implementation of the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 to be embedded into every agency and partnership arrangement. It represented a major “sea change” in the way emergency planning (Civil Protection) was organised.

The Civil Contingencies Act was designed to meet the challenges of the 21st century. To achieve this, agencies were divided into two groups, Category 1 response groups and Category 2 response groups.

Category 1 response groups are: Local Authorities, Police, Fire, Ambulance, Health Services, the Environment Agency and Maritime and Coastguard agencies.

54 Council of Europe. Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction. EUR-OPA Major Hazard Agreement. AP/CAT. 2005
Category 2 response groups are: Utility Companies, Airports, Train Operators, Network Rail, Harbours and Ports, the Highways Agency and the Health and Safety Executive.

In short, Category 1 response groups are the organisations at the heart of emergency response and they are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. They are required to:

- assess the risk (likelihood and impact) of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning (Local Resilience Forums, LRFs);
- put in place emergency plans;
- put in place Business Continuity Management arrangements (to ensure that plans are in place and have been tested);
- communicate with the public (make information available about civil protection matters, to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency);
- promote Business Continuity Management to the business and voluntary sector (obligatory for local councils only);
- co-operate with other local response groups to enhance co-ordination and efficiency.

Prior to the introduction of the Act, emergency planning was not viewed by some agencies as a necessary service for which to commit resources, time, and energy. When incidents occurred, agencies dealt with the problems or cooperated on the whole very well. Little attention was paid to recovery issues; it was more a reactive focus for many. The Act has led to a strengthening of the emergency planning function in all agencies especially now that it is a statutory duty, and the threat of terrorism and attack have become part of life in the UK.

Many emergency planning task groups have been formed under the umbrella of the local resilience forums. In addition to focussing on local resilience, there has been a steady influence of government guidance documents, which have been issued via the Regional Resilience Forums. These guidance documents have included planning for temporary mortuary provision, mass fatalities, and mass evacuation. As a result many existing plans have been reviewed and new plans produced. Training, exercises and test regimes have been strengthened. When incidents have occurred, the multi-agency response has improved due to the availability of robust plans, as well as knowledge and expertise in terms of roles and responsibilities.

Without doubt it is essential to ensure that all category 1 and 2 response groups, businesses and voluntary sector agencies stay in partnership. The use of the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships are vital for this process, as well as Home Office support and guidance. The National Community Safety Plan 2006-
09 sets standards/initiatives/targets for agencies. As yet there is no mention of
emergency planning in the plan. However, there is now an opportunity, using the
Civil Contingency Act 2004 to exchange information, plan, respond, recover and
assist in community safety issues. This would encourage shared use of resources,
and greater support to the community through a more cohesive approach, shared
visions and priorities, and shared understanding.

In October 2006, the Local Government White Paper Strong and Prosperous
Communities was published for consultation. Its main themes for local authorities
are to produce a Community Strategy, operate Strategic Partnerships, and have in
place Local Area Agreements. This paper seeks to realign services provided by
agencies on such issues as community safety, health and community cohesion.
It also provides an opportunity to empower communities and, further on, lays
ground for community safety and emergency planning to work together, not just
in preventing terrorism, but also improving the response and recovery plans for
when it happens.

3.2.2 A special case: the German Red Cross

The Red Cross in Germany does not only fulfil the role of a non-governmental
organisation with a humanitarian mission. In contrast to other European countries
represented in the Cities Against Terrorism project, the German Red Cross plays a
central role in managing crisis and emergency situations.

As a result of the political changes in Germany (East-West relations and
reunification), radical changes in the civil protection and disaster control, in
particular the assistance structures, took place in recent years. With this in regard,
the functions and structure of the German Red Cross were also changed.

Multi-functional employment units have been created, which can be quickly and
easily coordinated together with the emergency services and fire brigades. Within
the Red Cross, the direct connection of the medical group of the employment unit
with the emergency services, as well as the integration of the care group, closes the
existing supply deficit between the emergency services and the disaster control.

Management of and legal bases for the emergency services in Germany are
under the control of the federal states. The basis for the general rescue supply
is regulated by the national emergency service laws regulating the provision of
ambulances, medical material and other necessities needed in case of emergency.

55 Community Safety and Local Government Unit, Home Office. National Community Safety Plan
2006-2009, 2005
56 Department for Communities and Local Government. Strong and Prosperous Communities. The
57 This chapter is based on the lecture given by Rainer Wizenmann at the CAT Tübingen seminar.
Full report from this seminar is available at http://www.fesu.org
Personnel training for rescue workers, medics, aids, first responders and voluntary aids are an important and urgent task for the emergency services to undertake.

The emergency services and fire-brigades in Germany do not have enough experience of events following a terrorist attack. The lack of experience is evident when it comes to the problem of self-endangerment of the task forces through explosives, biological and chemical weapons or in case of exceptional injuries, e.g. amputations. There is also the issue of post-traumatic stress disorder for victims and rescuers alike. Other problems occur in cases with several deployment scenes, destroyed infrastructures, difficult communication and blocked traffic routes.

According to Mr. Wizenmann, necessary measures in order to counteract this lack of experience include the concentration of available deployment forces and training the rescuers in close-to-reality exercises. Another measure is training the task forces, especially all those who are not regularly active in emergency services. Constant coordination of deployment strategies with all safety organisations requires assistance in order to avoid friction within the rescue teams.

Problems may occur with too many rescuers at the scene and with untrained layman helpers. This can be avoided simply by selecting the wanted and needed assistants. In order to put it into practice, helpers should announce themselves to the directing centre before going to the scene.

In case of a mass accumulation of hurt people (MAHP) by terrorist attacks, it is of utmost importance that the involved organisations, especially the emergency services, disaster control and the German federal armed forces, are well coordinated. The hospitals should be equipped and trained on emergency plans in case of a MAHP. Civilians should be trained regularly in first aid in case of accidents.

The protection of the rescuers should not be forgotten, nor should the ability of civilians to practice first-aid and simple behaviour patterns in emergency situations. The media should be instructed not to give out uncoordinated information in order to avoid misinformation or even mass panic. There is an urgent need for action, especially as security services have gone through a change of attitude towards terrorist attacks. In brief, preparation and drilled exercises are crucial, as is prevention.

3.2.3 Crisis management in Poland: relevance of the regional level

There are many regulations in Poland that oblige public bodies, institutions and business entities to prepare various types of plans to respond to possible situations in which people's health, life and property is in danger. Planning public safety nationally, in Voïvodeships and within the local community [Table No.1] is a very complicated task, as presented in the table below. The role of the Voïvodeship

58 This chapter is mainly based on the lecture given by Grzegorz Kamienowski during the CAT Katowice seminar. Full report from this seminar is available at http://www.fesu.org
offices (the lowest levels of central government administration in Poland\(^5^9\), situated on the regional level) is crucial in this regard.

According to Mr Kamienowski, Director of the Silesian Crisis Management Centre, the creation of an efficient and effective crisis management system should be based on the following principles:

- the primacy of regional structures,
- individual leadership and responsibility,
- managing and increasing the responsibility of individual bodies exercising the power of general administration,
- adequacy,
- uniformity,
- separating the system of civil protection from the system of military defence, and appointing an individual to ensure cooperation between these two systems.

\(^{59}\) Only local and municipal administrations function under them.
Regarding the principle of separating the system of civil protection from the system of military defence, there is a formal separation, the nature of which is not fully autonomous or independent. As the elements of the whole system of the country's safety, the two systems should remain functionally related to each other. This means cooperation between certain bodies and structures of both military and non-military administration.

Whilst analysing the scope of practical application of the valid legal regulations, it should be noted that a Voïvode in Poland has some planning documents on the basis of which he will carry out the tasks related to crisis management in case of terrorist actions. These documents include:

1. **“Operational Plan of Voïvodeship Functioning”**.

The strategic objective of the Republic of Poland within the scope of defence is to maintain safe conditions for the fulfilment of national interests through protecting them against external crises and threats of war. One of the factors that help to achieve this objective is defensive planning, understood as the determination of ways to perform defensive tasks by central government administration bodies and local government bodies and to use the necessary forces and resources in order to perform those tasks, including operational planning and defensive planning.

2. **“National System of Crisis Emergency (NSCE)”**.

The National System of Crisis Emergency (NSCE) is a list of procedures and actions taken in order to maintain the general preparation of the country’s military and civil potential for effective protection against crisis situations, including the readiness to carry out military actions.

3. **“Crisis Response Plan of the Silesian Voïvodeship”**.

The crisis response plan specifies a series of actions to be taken in case of natural disasters, in particular:

- tasks within the scope of monitoring the threats;
- the balance of rescue forces and technical resources necessary to remove the effects of the threats;
- procedures of activating the tasks included in the plan and the principles of cooperation, as well as the ways of limiting the scale of losses and removing the effects of the threats;

As can be seen from the above presentation, the role of the Voïvodeship level is strategically important in planning crisis management and reacting immediately to terrorist attacks in the region.

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60 § 9 item 2 of the Council of Ministers’ Regulation dated 3 December 2002 concerning the way of creating the municipal response team, the poviat and voïwodeship crisis response team, and the government team of crisis coordination, and their functioning (Journal of Laws 02.215.1818)
However, in the event of a terrorist attack, the first groups to respond in Poland are not the regional units, but local fire departments, law enforcement bodies and emergency medical technicians. As response efforts escalate, the local emergency management agency and health department will help coordinate the necessary services. The primary duties of local departments, such as fire, law enforcement, along with those of the local emergency management agency and health department, are to be carefully addressed in their respective emergency operational plans.

3.3 Confidence-building measures

Managing the problem of terrorism requires a dual approach, on the one hand providing theoretical expertise on terrorist groups and their methods, and on the other hand, using an on-the-ground approach to use this technical knowledge. These two spheres of theory and practice interact with one another and help to develop a policy regarding the fight against terrorism.

Amongst the different experimental measures, putting into place measures to restore confidence represents one of the priority areas for governments and local authorities, especially when they are aimed at developing intercommunity dialogue. The importance of this issue results from attacks (in Madrid, London) and failed attacks (Dortmund, Koblenz, Glasgow, London61) carried out in Europe and which underlined the religious beliefs of the people involved. As although the majority of people involved in the German and British attacks were European citizens, the religious character of the attacks (according to their own claim as well as their links with existing networks) has made the European political authorities consider strengthening dialogue with the foreign communities, with the Muslim community at the top of the list. In fact, and since the attacks on American soil in September 2001, media coverage of members of the Al-Qaïda network and the fact that they were responsible for the attacks has created for many the fear that part of the Muslim population will be stigmatised. This has forced European politicians to act, on the one hand to avoid intercommunity tensions, and on the other in order to ensure that the radicalisation of violence does not develop into terrorism.

Strengthening or increasing intercommunity dialogue with the Muslim community represents one of the priorities for the fight against terrorism and an important measure to be developed for the long term, aiming to consolidate confidence between the different communities that make up society.

61 We must also note the arrest of three suspected terrorists on 4th September 2007 in Medebach-Oberschledorn, who, according to the state prosecutor Monika Harms, were planning car bomb attacks against places visited by Americans (night clubs, pubs and airports). The seized material matched what was used in the Madrid and London attacks. The headline in the French newspaper L’express - Allemagne: des terroristes prêts à agir, (Germany: terrorists ready to act), 5th September 2007 (www.lexpress.fr).
3.3.1 To the sources of the phenomenon of violence: the case of the Pakistani community in England

The problem of radicalised violence, above all amongst young people, is a worrying phenomenon for European authorities and especially when this violence has a religious dimension. The danger is analysing this issue exclusively based on religion, and ignoring the socio-economic factors. At a time when the Muslim community has seen some of its citizens involved in terrorist attacks, it is important to avoid any thing which may bring the community closer to terrorism, which makes it even more important to consider the factors which have lead to this radical violence.

The research carried out by Asima Shaikh\textsuperscript{62} within the Pakistani Muslim community in the South of England specifically tackles the issue of the radicalisation of violence amongst young Muslims. Based on the belief that local authorities are powerless faced with this issue, the research looks at factors which have led to an increase in the influence of religion and the politicisation of young Muslims, which both help develop radical violence in the greater sense.

The research carried out so far to which Asima Shaikh refers has shown us a series of factors, the most important of which are: socio-economic exclusion, intergenerational conflict, a local and world wide fear of Islam, British and American foreign policy, the identity crisis, and the conduct of certain radical religious groups. Identifying these factors has allowed five main areas of research to be identified, which are:

1) The socio-economic dimension
2) Leadership and government
3) Practicing a religion
4) The profiles of young people
5) The creation of an agenda to prevent the radicalisation of violence

Based on these five fields, the research carried out by Asima Shaikh was divided into two areas; the first part identified the socio-economic factors which lead to a radicalisation of violence, whilst the second studied the Muslim Community and all the identified areas. The results of this research as part of the fight against terrorism are very innovative, since they combine elements of sociology with political aspects concerning the links between the political authorities and Muslims.

Regarding the socio-economic dimension, the Muslim Pakistani community confronts different levels of deprivation in each community, which is something which has consequences on the young people and their link to violence. More specifically, the combination of a low level of education and difficult access to the

\textsuperscript{62} Asima Shaikh, \textit{Local level research with Muslim communities in towns in the south East of England}, presentation at the final conference of the CAT project in Brussels, 10th-11th September 2007.
labour market disheartens the young generation and fuels a feeling of disaffection with regards to their responsibility as citizens. This double negative experience may lead them to believe they are facing a form of institutional racism. This feeling of being different is not unique to one community in particular, and young people in general facing this type of problems may also develop this feeling. The risk is that this will expose them to external influences such as gangs or criminal groups. However, and depending on their ethnic, racial or community group, this link to violence occurs in a different way, as is the case for the members of the Pakistani community, where religion is, in this context, important.

Notwithstanding, it is essential to make clear that economic deprivation and poor education are not the only factors which explain why some young people radicalise and take part in violent political activities linked to terrorism. Asima Shaikh\textsuperscript{63} reminds us that the research carried out on this issue, and in particular on the socio-economic profile of bombers, shows contrasting results. Firstly, those who have nationalist aims (Palestinians in Hamas or the Tamil Tigers for example), or those who take part in a more global fight such as members of Al Qaeda, come from a high middle class. Secondly, other research carried out in Western Europe on bombers originally from North Africa showed that in contrast to the previous example, bombers were of working class origins. If the socio-economic profile of terrorists is thus not the only variable, there must be a very strong feeling of community belonging. In fact, in the case of people coming from privileged backgrounds, how can we explain their participation in violent acts, even murder? Young people’s perception of difficulties within their community leads them to identify themselves with the problem even if they are not directly affected by it. This solidarity with other Muslims in their community shows that only socio-economic factors need to be combined with an approach centred on the identity and feeling of belonging in order to understand the frustration expressed by and the demands of certain Muslim Pakistani coming from privileged backgrounds.

Young 2\textsuperscript{nd} or 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation British Pakistanis appear to be facing an identity crisis as a result of the aforementioned double issue of socio-economic and educational deprivation. This crisis is illustrated by the common use of the term “Paki” by young British people to denote Pakistanis. Use of this term suggests that in reality they are not English and that the only community they belong to is the Muslim community. The feeling of belonging either to the Muslim community or to another group (a gang for example) is becoming more and more often the response to their identity quest, which leads to the increasing perception of them being on the margins of society. In other words, for the young Pakistanis who formed part of the cross section studies, from the moment when their British nationality is put into question by others, it’s their religion and not their South-Asian origin which represents the way for them to develop their identity. This

\textsuperscript{63} Asima Shaikh, \textit{op. cit.}, p.5.
means that other groups offering an identity such as organised crime gangs or street gangs will also fulfil this role.

In this way, the loss of national identity is a recurring argument for nationalists. As Christina Schori Liang\textsuperscript{64} underlines, there is a similarity between Islamic and nationalist movements as they share a common vision of the enemy, being anti-American, anti-Jew and anti-globalisation. From this, joint practices could thus emerge, and give birth to a “hellish pact” between those who oppose the same values, or even worse share the same vision for the future.

The young Muslim generation as well as young Western Christians have thus become a target for radical Islamist groups on the one hand and nationalists on the other. In this way, and despite the efforts of young English or French Muslims to integrate into society, many of them will not achieve this. This situation generates resentment towards Western society, which is trying to use radical groups to its own advantage by promoting and spreading an integrational approach to Islam. One indicator of this radicalisation is the fact that a large number of this young generation criticise their parents for following a form of Islam which they see as too compliant with Western values and even too marked by the cultural and traditional practices in their countries of origin\textsuperscript{65}. This vision of Islam advocated by young Muslims involves being detached from all influences, even cultural, in order to promote a universal conception of belief.

As they follow a different form of Islam from their parents’, young Pakistanis do not attend the Mosques which the rest of the Muslim community use, visiting instead alternative and radical mosques where political Islam, not religious Islam is emphasised. As for recruitment, this happens mostly in the less privileged areas, but also within state institutions such as prisons. The fact that prisoners can, in certain cases, be grouped by their ethnic race of their religion, represents a favourable ground to convert, or lead young Muslims along the path to radical Islam.

The radicalisation of young people is a known process which raises a series of questions on the role of parents and authorities regarding prevention. Asima Shaikh’s study clearly showed a generation gap between parents and their children. In effect, parents’ lifestyles contrast with their offsprings’, as their lifestyles are still marked by the culture from their countries of origin. This generational gap leads parents to deny reality when faced with their children being involved in crime or drug trafficking. These problems are considered taboo, making any parental prevention policy impossible, which is in reality left to the representatives of the religious community in the Mosque.

\textsuperscript{64} Christina Schori Liang, \textit{From Nationalism to International Terrorism: A New Threat for the City?}, paper presented during the final conference of the CAT project in Brussels, 10th-11th September 2007.

\textsuperscript{65} Asima Shaikh, \textit{op. cit.}, p.7.
The role of religious leaders is therefore subject to debate and above all subject to how the community itself operates. Criticisms brought against the Pakistani community regarding their representation speak of a culturally conservative vision still rooted in Pakistan rather than considering local issues. To this we can add an element of internal politics, as so that local leaders can maintain their position, they voluntarily follow a traditional religious line based on religious guidelines provided by their representatives at the national level. Consequently, local religious leaders worry more about the situation of residents in Cashmere villages than about the members of the local Pakistani community. Differences between this and the aspirations of young Pakistanis often increase.

In this context, the role of local authorities appears fundamental in order to prevent the radicalisation of young Muslims. According to Asima Shaikh, attempts at community dialogue have produced the opposite effect as they emphasise the feeling that the members of the Muslim community are victims. Although the factors causing radicalisation have been identified (education and socio-economic background), it’s principally at the political level where the government is focussed and concentrates on Islamic ideologist issues. Somewhat contradictorily, it’s the British government and the local authorities’ political approach which has made the Pakistani community realise its political dimension. However, radical violence develops on other levels, and it is here where local authorities have not yet provided a satisfactory response.

The phenomenon of radicalising violence amongst young people as well as how Asima Shaikh analysed it amongst the Pakistani Community, shows that there are two essential elements to take into account. Firstly, the fact that more and more young British Muslims are turning towards an integrational Islam in search of a new identity. This Islam may or may not cover a political dimension, and is not necessarily radical. Secondly, at the heart of the radical part of the Muslim community are Islamists who try to recruit young Muslims into activities which may lead to terrorist action. In other words, it is important to distinguish between these two processes, the one which drives young people to Islam for identity reasons, and the one practiced by extremists aiming to recruit young Muslims to radical Islam.

3.3.2 Cooperation between minorities and police: the case of Muslims in Germany

In the section on prevention we mentioned the example of the German Muslims and the fact that intercommunity dialogue is from now on undisputedly a tool which will try to maintain and develop a link between the Muslim community and the authorities.

Contrary to the previous example which dealt with Pakistani Muslims, the Muslim communities in Germany are principally composed of people of Turkish
origin who migrated in the 60s and 70s. Today, this community has a population of 3.2 million, of which half a million are German citizens. As well as being the third religion in Germany, Islam has firmly implanted itself in the country with many mosques built and religious classes offered to the young generation of Muslims. The presence of this important Muslim community in Germany has raised, like all immigration issues of this scale, a few problems with integration, similar to the debate caused by wearing headscarves in work places for example.

The attacks in the United-States, and also in Europe after 2001, have put the spotlight on Muslims in European societies. The increasingly intense debate has focused on community dialogue between authorities and Muslims. This dialogue takes different forms depending on whether it is in Britain, Germany or one of the countries not analysed as part of the CAT project.

In the English example, the social dimension is of secondary importance, as mentioned in the previous section, with a more security and political-based approach of community dialogue taking precedent. The central element of any attempt at dialogue is partners’ mutual confidence, in this case between the members of the Pakistani community, the Metropolitan Police, and above all the security services. In fact, and according to Asima Shaikh, relations between these groups have always been difficult. This is due to a lack of mutual confidence between representatives of the Metropolitan Police and the Pakistanis. The police’s poor knowledge of the community’s socio-economic, cultural and religious background combined with arrests of Pakistanis which are deemed to be unjust, do not provide the best foundation from which to build constructive dialogue. This being the case, potential informers hesitate to provide information to the police, and if they do, they do not feel they are being adequately protected against reprisals from members of their own community. Initiatives have thus been taken to combat this. In this way, in the county of Somerset in the South-West of England, the Minority Faith Protective Security Initiative project66, has tried to emphasise protecting minorities’ places of worship (principally mosques and synagogues). This programme outlines for example assigning a policeman to carry out dialogue with representatives from these communities, firstly in order to identify the needs of this community regarding their places of worship, and in the worst case to form links with local specialist agencies, and secondly to anticipate all sources of potential conflict with the authorities as with the rest of the population, with the creation of mobile posts to receive and deal with complaints. The aim is to lower tension between the general public and certain communities which often feel stigmatised during terrorist attacks in the UK as much as abroad, whilst ensuring that there is greater protection for these communities, which is clearly visible. In this way, by guaranteeing increased security for the minority communities, this programme hopes to be able to increase their confidence in the authorities.

66 Pete Nash and Dylan Aplin, Minority Faith Protective Initiative, paper presented during the 1st CAT project seminar at the University of Bristol, 28th-29th September 2006.
The question of confidence is therefore central for intercommunity dialogue, with the important aspect being strengthening it, or trying to re-establish it, as is the case with the Pakistani community in England. On this point, the investigations carried out in August 2006 by the Metropolitan Police in this community regarding the fight against terrorism did not decrease this feeling of mistrust. As even if the threat of a terrorist attack justifies a proactive approach on the part of the security forces, Asima Shaikh estimates that this approach confirmed the idea that every Muslim is a potential terrorist. This may therefore be another motivation for young members of this community to take a more radical path. This situation is becoming more and more complicated as the Metropolitan Police’s action has affected the good image that it used to enjoy as well as that of the local police which operate in the communities. Furthermore, knowing that the South-Asian community has never regularly collaborated with the police, especially with criminal affairs, the creation of community dialogue has shown itself complicated to establish.

According to Mounir Azzaoui\textsuperscript{67}, the German context is completely different with regards to dialogue with the authorities, even if the measures’ impact on the Muslim community isn’t without similarity to the English example. Originally, it was on the initiative of Muslim organisations that dialogue began. In fact, in response to their request to increase security within German society, the Federal security services invited two organisations to a conference in September 2005: the Turkish-Muslim Organisation (Türkisch islamischen Union der Anstalt für Religion\textsuperscript{4}, DITIB) and the National German Muslim Council (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD). This meeting allowed a working group to be created on “the introduction of confidence-building measures” centred on around 5 areas focusing on practice, not theory:

1. Naming the contact people at the Muslim services and the security services in order to facilitate the implementation of confidence-building measures and the joint organisation of activities.
2. Promoting dialogue and communication to make the Muslim community aware of the security services’ aims, and reciprocally, allow the security services to get to better know this community through an exchange of information.
3. As an extension to the previous point, informing the Muslim community of the aims and means used by the security services as part of the fight against terrorism, especially regarding Islam and terrorism, as well as more social problems such as juvenile delinquency, drug trafficking and domestic violence. Simultaneously, information on Islam, the lives of Muslims in Germany and the work of Muslim Federations must be central to security services.

\textsuperscript{67} He was spokesman for the National German Muslim Council until December 2006 and took part as an expert during conferences organised as part of the CAT project (Tübingen and Brussels). We are principally referring to the following document: Mounir Azzaoui, \textit{Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen – Zusammenarbeit zwischen Muslimen und Sicherheitsbehörden in Deutschland}, 4\textsuperscript{th} CAT project seminar at the University of Tübingen, 27\textsuperscript{th}-28\textsuperscript{th} November 2006.
4. Improving the training on Islam of security service agents through lessons given by Muslim scientists.
5. The creation of hotlines, which assure that calls are confidential, so that sensitive information can be passed on in order to prevent attacks being organised in Germany.

These measures, which have practicality very much in mind, are possible responses to the problems raised by Asima Shaikh in his study, be it by introducing a framework to promote community dialogue or by getting partners to pass on information on to each other to improve knowledge of one another. These measures tackle a more social and human aspect of the fight against terrorism which in addition complement the action carried out by the working group Security and Islam, launched this year by the Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble68.

Nevertheless, the implementation of such measures has provoked mistrust of the authorities from the part of the Muslim community, as although this dialogue was initiated by Muslim organisations, the final result gives the impression of stigmatisation, rather than working towards better integration. In the German example, there appears to be a difference between the Muslim Community and public opinion, which sees anyone of the Islamic faith as being a suspect. In this case, and as a complement to the means developed in the social and economic areas, it is necessary to strengthen the cultural dimension of prevention policies. The concept of “dialogue between cultures”, as defined by Denis de Rougemont69, could form a suitable area to reflect on in order to promote understanding as much as possible between the world’s main civilisations and notably, between Christians and Muslims in Europe. The security-based objective which today dominates political initiatives regarding dialogue with the Muslim community must have, amongst its numerous aims, a cultural aim. In fact, this represents one of the only ways of avoiding the rest of society discriminating and stigmatising the Muslim community. Consequently, it’s through the implementation of definitive measures, such as those which make up the programme of the German working group, that this dialogue will be able to establish itself. It will also need the means to reduce the strong emotional dimension which characterises the fight against terrorism and which leads to only solutions from the security approach being used.

3.4 Victim support

Victims are the face of an attack, whose physical and psychological suffering will constantly remind the political authorities of the need to integrate the human dimension into the fight against terrorism. This concerns prevention policies such as intercommunity dialogue as much as victim support in the short and long term.

68 Report from the 4th CAT project seminar held at the University of Tübingen, 27th-28th November 2006, p. 18.

following an attack. The high level of media coverage of terrorism, due to the attacks and attempted attacks committed in America and Europe since 2001, has provoked international condemnation, recalling that no political or ideological motive excuses the use of terrorism. These events have put the question of victim support and their national and international legal status back in the spotlight. In this way, during the unanimous condemnations of terrorism after the attacks on 11th March 2004 in Madrid, the European Union’s Council of Europe proposed making this date a commemorative date to remember all victims of terrorism. Far from a symbolic gesture, the concept of victim support must today be rethought and developed in consideration of previous experiences and of the characteristics of modern terrorism, whose attacks at the beginning of the millennium represented a turning point in modern society.

3.4.1 Managing the response to the victims

Forming an adequate response to victims of terrorism beforehand requires us to know victims’ profiles. As part of the research carried out by Lina Kolesnikova\textsuperscript{70} and presented during the CAT project, three types of victims have been identified: primary, secondary and tertiary victims. Victims are categorised depending on their geographical relation to the terrorist target and the injuries (physical or psychological) they have suffered.

- a. Primary victims are those who were geographically close to the site of the attack. This includes people mortally wounded, survivors who are seriously injured and people who took part in the attack. This group of victims is generally limited in number, except when attacks happen on a large scale, as was the case for example on 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2001.

- b. Secondary victims are the people who are close to the primary victims, be they family, friends, work colleagues or close acquaintances. The inherent violence in all terrorist acts combined with the aim of injuring as many people as possible leads to psychological issues within, but not exclusively, this circle of close friends. In fact, the front line actors who intervene after an attack (special forces, the police, fire-fighters, the military, medical personnel, rescuers, psychologists) also suffer from a psychological shock as they rescue and organise help for the victims. People working for associations involved in the rescue (The Red Cross for example) also belong to this category.

- c. Tertiary victims, by far the largest category, includes all those who feel directly affected by the attacks, even if they were not present at the site, nor in the targeted city or country. Media coverage of the attack, which would have been researched by the terrorists, provoked a feeling of not only solidarity, but

\textsuperscript{70} Lina Kolesnikova, Managing assistance to the Victims of Terrorist Act: The European experience, paper presented during the final conference of the CAT project in Brussels, 10\textsuperscript{th}-11\textsuperscript{th} September 2007.
also identification with the victims as the attacks on 11th September 2001 in the United States clearly show. The unanimous condemnation from a large part of the international community, combined with a joint expression of sympathy for these tragic events help this process of identification develop. A French daily newspaper clearly expressed it: “Nous sommes tous Américains”71. The spectacular character of the attacks, be it by the number of victims or the damage inflicted, can also mean tertiary victims to suffer like primary and secondary victims, possibly needing medical or psychological care. Fear of another attack can generate a state of stress amongst the public, justifying this status of tertiary victims. It is, and we must recall it, one of the terrorists’ objectives to spread within society a feeling of insecurity leading to the public changing their ways of life. In a certain way, tertiary victims are the involuntary catalysts for social changes which terrorists aim for.

The time variable is another factor in the victim support equation, as the response to a terrorist attack includes different action processes, which can be categorised into three groups:

1. The first group of processes tackle immediate issues and concern the phase before and during the attack, until the first rescuers arrive

2. The second group operates in the short term and deals with the phase after the attack, with the arrival of emergency services to treat and evacuate those injured to hospital

3. The third group looks into the long term and aims on the one hand to care for people who have suffered trauma following the attacks, and on the other hand, adapting if necessary the general victim support response based on the experience of this attack.

This analysis will allow the people and the type of processes needed during an attack relative to victim support to be specified. The combination of these elements allows a general scenario to be reached which takes into account all these elements and whose priority is responding to the time variable relative to victim’s profiles.

**A: Before the event**

This is the authorities’ prevention stage; they try to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack through prevention policies but also by anticipating the risk for the people on the front line, and by testing the planning measures and the crisis management protocols.

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71 Jean-Marie Colombani, “Nous sommes tous Américains” (We are all American), Le Monde, 13th September 2001
B: Immediate response on the site of the attack

The majority of terrorist attacks are unpredictable and it is not easy to provide an adequate response to an attack when the length and the type of attack are not known. However a hostage situation or a plane hijacking for example, are specific and established protocols can be followed. With hostages for example, it is necessary to ensure that teams on the ground are equipped with provisions (water, food and medication amongst others) and that sensitive information on the hostages is not transmitted (principally their religion, nationality, and job). This stage, which is marked by the need for immediate responses, includes 4 types of victim which are briefly outlined below.

1. Witnesses and people in the immediate area must be evacuated (depending on the type of attack) and receive medical and psychological assistance if necessary. Minimum information on the operation underway is released, in order to avoid any speculation.

2. If someone is injured in the attack, the families will be informed when possible. Psychological and medical support is absolutely necessary. If the emergency situation prolongs, as is the case in a hostage situation, families should be divided into small groups led by a psychologist in order to avoid a large crowd of people at the attack site. This means that the local authorities must anticipate the number of people involved in order to respond to this demand. This option must be made available for the victim’s wider circle of acquaintances (colleagues, neighbours, friends). In this case, it is through a communication network and an emergency telephone number especially that information is passed on during such events. Psychological assistance on the telephone is also available for this circle of acquaintances.

3. People on the front line and experts involved, such as those from NGOs, must be kept up to date on the situation and ready to anticipate any additional medical or psychological demands.

4. The civil population must be kept informed of events and guaranteed access to information through means that were used during the prevention stage, such as a hotline for example. This element is particularly important in the case of a biological or chemical attack, in order to avoid mass panic.

C: Response in case of an attack (short term)

This type of attack leads to two plans of action being developed, one each for primary and secondary victims. The two are differentiated between:

1. Primary victims
   - treatment and evacuation from the area
- diagnosing injuries and providing medical treatment at the site of the attack
- separation and evacuation of injured people
- hospitalisation of injured people, then release once the treatment has been applied (depending on the state of the victims)
- rehabilitation of victims and their family and friends after the attack
- the launch of a witness protection programme if necessary

Psychological support for primary victims is essential, as Lina Kolesnikova underlines by illustrating that during the Sarin gas attack by the sect “Aum Shinrikyo” on the Tokyo Metro (20th March 1995), the risk of being psychologically traumatised (80%) was greater than effectively being contaminated (20%)72.

2. Secondary victims
- release information on the location and state of family/friends
- move people away from the attack site if necessary
- ensure victims are cared for (shelter and food)
- make medical treatment and psychological support available
- offer administrational and financial support in case of a family member dying
- Offer legal and financial support to children who have become orphans following the attack.

As the action plan for the primary victims is extended, a psychological support unit must be made available for secondary victims, which once again confirms the need to have this type of support at all stages that precede and follow an attack. Carrying out these stages needs the authorities to have at hand different information, above all the number of victims, the families’ contact numbers, and a record of treatment during and after the attack. Helping primary and secondary victims is extremely complex as it does not only depend on the impact of the attack on the public (number of victims) but also on the location (access to the site) and the nature of the attack (conventional, gas etc.). But the biggest difficulty is offering an adequate response to the primary victims in the long term so that they can re-find their place within society.

D: Long term responses (returning to “normal” life)

The people who survive an attack do not all demand the same responses from authorities as they all have different needs. Some of them will be looking for a mostly medical response (i.e. those in treatment), whereas others will be looking for a social and psychological response, i.e. orphans. However in every case, the victims will be constantly asking themselves what motivation drove the people who committed the attacks to do such a thing. For the benefit of those who cannot stop thinking about this victimisation, the government could release information to the public relative to the attack and the enquiry underway (except information which threatens national security).

72 Lina Kolesnikova, *op. cit.*, p.4.
More fundamentally, it appears that today it is necessary for all victims to be grouped together within one database which will allow the national and local authorities to bring together the services and the benefits that are going to be awarded to them, i.e. legal, financial, medical and psychological support. This approach in reality raises the issue of the status of victims of terrorism, as European legislation is far from being homogenous.

3.4.2 Victim support: the psychological response

Long term action is certainly the weakest aspect of victim support, as Anabela Rodrigues underlines that it is not always possible for the authorities to know who the victims of terrorist acts are, and above all, the medical and psychological dimension is no longer integrated into antiterrorist approaches when the urgency of the situation ends. This aspect is linked to those responsible for supervising victim support, and who are principally the police and special forces. Dealing with the medical and psychological treatment of victims of terrorist acts appears to be no longer one of their responsibilities, especially in the long term. Therefore, support for victims of terrorist attacks in the long term is disconnected from the general approach of the fight against terrorism.

Nevertheless, the example given by the Portuguese Republican National Guard (GNR) is an interesting example of a military force which has integrated a psychological support activity into its everyday mission of protecting and defending the citizens. Galvão da Silva and Bruno Brito remind us that the management of critical accidents did not originally have its own specific guideline framework, and the missions were not led by professionals. Although the emergence of a terrorist threat on the European continent is nothing new, the attacks in the United States promoted the creation of a department specifically responsible for managing crises. This favoured the availability of resources from other administrational bodies, especially the GNR, whose responsibilities lie in several areas: psychological support, social services, religious support, public relations, the media, and managing and coordinating crisis situations.

The role of the security forces in the area of educational support is an important issue, as they are often the first people in direct contact with the victims at the site of the attack. Their involvement does not limit cooperation with other groups, in fact quite the opposite. The research carried out by Galvão da Silva and Bruno Brito

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73 For more information on this subject, see the report from the European Forum for Victim Services which brings together 20 victim support organisations and is entitled Declaration concerning the Victim Statute during the Mediation process (www.euvictimsservices.org).

74 Anabela Rodrigues Victim’s right and restorative justice – A complex relationship, paper presented during the 2nd CAT project seminar at the New University of Lisbon/Atlantic University in Lisbon, 26th-27th October 2006.

75 Galvão da Silva and Bruno Brito Victims of Terrorism: the Psychosocial Response of the Security Forces, paper presented during the final CAT project conference in Brussels, 10th-11th September 2007.
Brito (coordinators of another project financed under the same budgetary line\textsuperscript{76}) states that terrorist attacks are dealt with in the same way as natural disasters, i.e. where the response by the authorise requires a very local human and technical mobilisation. Therefore the security agencies and emergency services have adopted cooperation agreements involving several institutions. This new concept, defined and adopted by the general security and emergency services in the United States, has been introduced into Portuguese law. In this way, one of the elements in this concept is supporting and protecting victims. The role of the GNR in this area covers, as Lina Kolesnikova mentions, above all the following aspects: evacuating and protecting victims, contacting their families, overseeing information given to injured people or to people who are not considered as victims, and either directly psychologically supporting the victims or indirectly by coordinating work teams of psychologists.

The psychological support model implemented by the GNR leads to a new, more reactive approach which is above all better integrated into the chain of commandment during a crisis or terrorist situation in particular. The benefit can be shown in terms of effectiveness on the ground, but also regarding legitimacy, as this direct support to victims strengthens the link between the security forces and the public. Notwithstanding, the GNR’s activity is principally aimed at the short term and needs to be developed for the long term by ensuring that victims of terrorism continue to receive psychological support. More generally speaking, it’s effectively at this level that the most important work remains to be done; working so that victims of terrorism do not keep inside this feeling of insecurity and anguish.

\textsuperscript{76} Pilot Projects Victims of Terrorist Acts, 2005, DG Freedom, Justice and Security, European Commission
OUTCOMES FOR THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES
4. OUTCOMES FOR THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES

4.1 Guidelines for a training package

The aim of this project was initially to reflect on the problem that terrorism presents to local authorities and to develop an educational package which will allow continual training of the people on the front line, especially policemen and social workers. Developing guidelines rather than an educational framework is due to the extreme similarity of experiences at the local level (when they exist) in dealing with the fight against terrorism. Therefore, the proposed measures are presented as elements within a more general framework which will lead to the development of a continual training programme.

We have created four guidelines within this framework which we consider as essential, preceded by a reminder of the context in which cities are fighting against terrorism. Each of these guidelines is composed of a summary presentation of the issues, such as those already discussed in this report. A series of questions will conclude this potential programme, which can be used to begin continual training and for experts to debate and confront knowledge.

4.2 Introductory guideline “From global to local terrorism”

► Why is the local level affected by international terrorism?

Modern terrorism has always had an international dimension, even when the attacks were limited to one area (IRA, ETA). The financing of terrorist activities in the wider sense (materials, people) has often taken place through international financial networks. The new characteristic of modern terrorism is its global nature. The target is no longer one country, government or politicians from a given area, but a system of values. Consequently, every element which forms this system of values, from individuals to human achievements, become potential targets. In this context, cities, and more precisely cosmopolitan cities or cities which have a political role (capital cities), are particularly at risk. This, when combined with the government’s foreign policy, results in strengthening or decreasing the size of the threat for local authorities.

► How do cities confront these new forms of threats?

Managing the terrorist threat at the local level raises a series of political and technical questions.

a) Are authorities politically capable of managing this threat?

This question deals with the organisational structure of the state. In a federal state, local authorities have many responsibilities, following the model of the Lander (Germany), whereas in a centralised state, there is no model which can be applied besides the prerogatives general available to the capital cities. Notwithstanding, the implications of international terrorism at the local level progressively help to
develop this issue, as the local level is undoubtedly connected to the international approach. The strengthening of police cooperation at the European level as well as the exchange of expertise relating to prevention policies should help politically strengthen the role of local authorities. This is particularly true in relations between the authorities and foreign communities, where the local level remains the best politically adapted to analyse the importance of religion amongst young Muslims for example. Local authorities need a legal framework which specifies their role within the fight against terrorism. Clearly identifying the roles and functions of each of the actors at each of the state’s level (national, local) is also a way of guaranteeing the effectiveness of local authorities’ action.

b) Are authorities technologically capable of managing this threat?

For a long time, the terrorist threat at the local level has been dealt with by measures aiming to prevent crime on an individual basis and to protect people’s property. If a car or block of flats explodes, initially it will not be known if this was a criminal attack or an accident, unless someone immediately claims responsibility for it, in as what is known as the conventional approach. In this case, managing a terrorist threat appears similar to a prolonged management of a natural disaster or accident. However, the emergence of modern terrorism has meant that local authorities from now on are constrained to modifying the whole of their approach, be it in terms of prevention and victim support, as we shall see in the next point. Managing this threat is not only a short term issue, as in the medium and long term the people involved are offered training, and the local authorities are offered financial resources.

Questions to consider:
- What is terrorism?
- Which authorities are involved in managing a terrorist threat (in the short, medium and long term)?
- What resources are available in case of a terrorist attack (mobilised units, aid)?
- What are the legal provisions regarding the fight against terrorism, when they exist?
- In your opinion, are antiterrorist measures dissuasive enough?

4.3 Guideline I: “Prevention and communication”

Should we promote prevention policies as the only reaction to the terrorist threat?

It is evident that the preventative approach (information, infiltration, social and intercommunity dialogue) and the reactive approach (controls and greater protection measures in sensitive places - Embassies, airports, stations and public buildings amongst others) complement each other and are both necessary above all due to the social dimension which leads to terrorism today. The fact that we are
asking this question underlines this evolution, with safety from now on dependant on an approach centred more on the socio-economic and religious factors of those involved in terrorist attacks. In other words, as people involved in terrorist networks and activities are identifiable, and do not represent an enemy without a face, the strengthening of the prevention approach as a compliment to reactive measures can be justified. This does however raise practical problems. The fact that the people involved in terrorist actions have similar profiles to those involved in urban violence may mean that this issue should be treated as a problem of crime prevention. Yet the existence of highly structured networks, the high use of technology and the high cost involved, and above all the convergence of all of these elements towards a final goal, i.e. carrying out an attack, requires a different type of prevention approach. Furthermore, the fact that terrorists are willing to sacrifice their own lives for a cause justifies local authorities considering what their motivations are for this involvement. This is even more important as the profile of the people involved varies greatly, since carrying out an attack requires many different skills (recruiting, financing, planning, planting bombs). Therefore, the aspects that form this prevention policy are educational (school supervision and monitoring, respecting the state’s values), but also socio-economical and political (economic and political integration in society, the creation of intercommunity dialogue with the authorities).

► How can we define a local prevention strategy regarding the fight against terrorism?

The terrorist threat requires a global or multi-level approach where all key areas are interconnected: prevention, crisis management, intercommunity dialogue and victim support. The interconnection of these four pillars is a central issue, which needs beforehand a legal framework specifying the mission of each group involved and of each of the state’s levels, notably: the police (local, regional, national), emergency services (fire-fighters, doctors), psychologists and social workers. Once these people are identified, their missions can be precisely defined whilst taking into account the duration (short, medium or long term) and the specific nature of the threat (conventional, chemical, biological or nuclear). Once this general framework has been established, it is then possible to develop strategies for each of these four pillars.

In terms of prevention, there are two main aims to consider:

1) creating permanent dialogue between authorities and citizens, whilst regularly informing them of the alert level, assistance protocols and evacuation in case of an attack;
2) prevention and communication policies must not lead to an increase in a feeling of insecurity; on the contrary they must maintain a calm climate within the community.

This co-operative partnership between authorities and citizens is to the key
to success for this prevention strategy. The consequence of this co-operational strategy is that the roles in particular of local people working on the front line and of policemen become more important. As a matter of fact, in order that prevention at the local level is effective, the local level must be strengthened in two ways. Firstly, decentralisation must be introduced or developed in order to recognise the importance of the local level in prevention systems in countries which are considered as exclusively allocating responsibilities to their prevention systems. Secondly, local actors should be involved and should have greater powers, especially decision making powers. The combination of these two elements will allow actors’ responsibilities to increase, as well as their right to be involved, be it in prevention or more general crisis management. Formally recognising their role also has an effect on the local communities in which they operate, as they become more visible to the citizens and the representatives of foreign communities, thus promoting intercommunity dialogue.

► What aspects make up prevention policies?

Prevention policies cover areas as varied as collecting information, relaying information to the general public, protecting buildings, holding dialogue with citizens and education. These two last aspects represent the two most recent to be tackled as part of the fight against terrorism, and in particular within multicultural societies. Although multiculturalism has many positive elements, it can also be a source of tensions between different ethnic, nationalist or religious groups. These tensions can be worsened by socio-economic problems such as unemployment, a high level of immigration, a low level of education and a mistrust of certain values and practices within European society. The risk of marginalisation can represent a favourable ground for terrorist propaganda or terrorist activities themselves to spread. In this context, tools aimed at preventing crime can be adapted for local authorities trying to integrate or assimilate immigrants, in three ways: the introduction of a process of cultural integration, the improvement of cohesion as well as intercommunity relations (learning to live together), and support for the authorities in the form of mediation during intercommunity conflict and launching positive discrimination programmes. Education as a prevention tool in this case aims to lead to the sharing and exchanging of life experiences, for which cultural differences are not a stopping point, but rather a link between the different communities. If contact between local authorities and communities is essential for the good working of the education aspects of this prevention policy, it is equally important for a leader to be identified within these communities who the authorities can regularly contact (see Guideline III).

► How should authorities inform the public without causing a climate of fear in their city?

Communication over questions of security, especially terrorism, is a complicated issue, as information has the potential to create a climate of fear amongst the public. Appeals for calm after a bomb explosion or relaying security advice in
an airport are both potential sources of stress and confusion for many people. This can worsen if the content of messages is contradictory. If the success of the fight against terrorism depends on excellent coordination between the local and national levels as well as the local communities, communication must also follow this same principle. In effect, it is very important to ensure that a reliable information system exists, i.e. one that allows information to circulate between everyone involved in order to promote greater coordination of their actions, be they dealing with prevention, crisis management or intercommunity dialogue. As although the content of communication varies according to the type of action, coordination between sources of information is essential whether the information is for the local authorities or for the public.

**Questions to consider:**
- How can we define a “good” prevention policy?
- What must happen before we can define a prevention strategy?
- Why is it necessary to increase the role of local authorities regarding prevention policies?
- Why does our societies’ multicultural character increase the need for prevention measures?
- How can crime prevention be useful in the fight against terrorism?
- What are the aims of communication policies?
- What is the difference between a preventative communication and crisis management?
- In your opinion, are we well informed of the risks of a terrorist threat?
- What information on terrorism must be released to the public?

4.4 Guideline II : “Crisis Management”

> Should terrorism have its own specific crisis management approach?

The notion of a crisis covers a series of catastrophes, be they of natural causes or enjendered by humans, and includes environmental disasters and terrorist attacks. Crisis management aims to confront any type of crisis no matter its origin by mobilising all human and technical expertise necessary. The attacks of 9th September 2001 in the United States, like those on 11th March 2004 in Madrid and on 7th and 21st July 2005 in London, made terrorism a priority for international and national political agendas. With terrorism under the spotlight, which after all is not something new, antiterrorist measures have been developed and strengthened in all European states.

The question asked of the local authorities is whether the fight against terrorism would benefit from a specific approach or whether it would be better if it was integrated into the general crisis management approach. The majority of European and international organisations tend to distinguish between terrorism and other crises, which leads to a range of actions taking place. Meanwhile, for local authorities, it’s both a political and logistical question. Logistically speaking,
it is complex and financially expensive to have a specialised intervention approach aimed only at antiterrorism. When the foundations of antiterrorist policies come from expertise learnt in the field of crime (prevention) or crisis management (planning and logistics), the problem of terrorism generally remains part of the existing approach.

The specificities of contemporary terrorism, above all its global dimension, lead to new strategies being developed, such as greater coordination between those people involved in the fight. From a political point of view, national authorities as well as local, have to be seen to be reacting in order to point out to citizens the political importance of the fight against terrorism, and above all to win over potential voters. The way the fight against terrorism is politically dealt with could therefore lead to a separate approach being considered for this type of crisis compared to other crises, which would certainly be developed specifically towards terrorism, but within an established frame.

**How can we improve crisis management regarding the fight against terrorism?**

Crisis management depends on the structural organisation of each state and on the responsibilities that local authorities hold, which makes it difficult to create a European model. Nevertheless, we have been able to observe throughout this project a common trait within the different processes and people involved in crisis management: the need to develop coordination between each area of expertise, on the one hand within the same organisation, and on the other hand between different levels of the state (local, regional and national). However implementing circles of cooperation requires a legal framework authorising the transfer of the necessary expertise, which will benefit everyone in this circle of cooperation.

The British model perfectly illustrates the new requirement of crisis management. For a long time, crisis management approaches worked on the basis of “Integrated Emergency Management” (IEM), which was responsible for anticipating, evaluating, preventing, responding and covering all types of incidents. This model, which in essence is rather dependant on events rather than being proactive, was able to serve as a platform for the introduction in 2004 of the Civil Contingencies Act. This new law makes crisis management plans at the local level mandatory. Up until now, crisis management principally dealt with short term actions, but from now on, local authorities must also consider crisis management in the long term. Generally speaking, the majority of crisis management plans have been reviewed, and now emphasise the “multi-agency approach”, which involves everyone on the front line, or the first category (as it is known by the British authorities) and second category group (land and air transport, but also health service management). In order to test this new concept, in which the multi agency approach is central, many simulations have been created. Nevertheless, this new approach has not yet been replicated at the national level since it is not part of
the National Security Plan for 2006-2009, which fixes the standards, policies and aims for the groups involved in security policies. It was therefore up to the local authorities to use this law for civil incidents from 2004 onwards, which allowed them to more directly contribute to the national security policy, above all through exchanging information and expertise. The role of the English local authorities could be paramount in improving management crisis at the national level, similar to the German example, where Munich’s prevention project (BIRGIT) was recreated in other cities in the German Länder.

The multi agency approach is one of the characteristics of the German crisis management model. However, a specific role is awarded to one organisation that is officially an NGO, but acts in this context almost like a state, and that is the Red Cross. In fact, contrary to its European counterparts, the German Red Cross plays a key role in the crisis management approach as a result of the German reunification. The Länder are responsible for general crisis management as part of an approach will allows fast coordination, especially with the emergency and fire services. These services are then directly linked to the Red Cross, who also have an important role in the approach. Faced with the possibility of a terrorist attack and the damage which some weapons can cause (biological, chemical), crisis management services have stated that they are suffering from a lack of expertise. Consequently, and as in the British case, simulation exercises are necessary, with particular focus on coordination between the different groups involved in crisis management, from fire-fighters to the Red Cross.

Questions to consider:
- What is crisis management?
- What people are involved in crisis management?
- What are the key areas to ensure effective crisis management?
- Does crisis management depend on the centralised or decentralised nature of the state?
- Should local authorities manage a crisis resulting from an environmental catastrophe in the same way as a terrorist attack?
- What are the similarities and differences between crisis management in Germany and in England?
- What does the multi-agency approach consist of in your community?
- In your opinion, is crisis management effective enough?

4.5 Guideline III: “Intercommunity dialogue”

Why is intercommunity dialogue an important tool in the fight against terrorism?

European societies have become more and more multicultural and the need to maintain the link between the authorities and the different foreign communities
is essential in order to guarantee greater coherence within society. Since the wave of attacks in the United States and Europe, the place of foreign communities has become a sensitive issue insofar as the nationalities and religions of the terrorists were not respectfully European or Christian. Similarly, terrorist groups’ attacks have focused public attention on a conflict of values, leading to greater debate on the issue of the place for the Muslim community. In order to avoid any connection between the members of a community, Muslim in this case, and the issue of terrorism, authorities can use the tool of intercommunity dialogue. Due to their proximity to foreign communities, local authorities are the key actors within intercommunity dialogue.

The problem is becoming even more important as young Muslims are more and more often asked to practice a more extreme form of Islam, which some see as the beginnings to radical violence. Consequently, it is essential to identify the factors which lead to these two distinct processes—fundamentalism and radical violence—before we consider in detail their possible links.

**Why are young Muslims interested in a more conservative Islam?**

By looking at the example of the Pakistani Community in the South of England, we can see that the young generation lives in an unfavourable socio-economic context, which leads to insufficient education levels and even more difficult access to the labour market. These factors may lead young people to develop a sense of exclusion and feel a form of institutional racism. Nevertheless, the socio-economic context is not the only variable which can explain why young people may be driven to practice a more fundamental form of Islam. Another factor is the identity of these young Pakistanis. Those with British nationality suffer from not being regarded as such, which leads them to think that only their Muslim identity cannot be debated.

The feeling of belonging to a group is an important factor, in particular for young people who feel excluded from the economic, cultural and social life of their country. This however does not explain their transition to an extremist form of their religion. In fact, they may also be tempted to join gangs or criminal groups in which they will develop an identity.

This process leads them to embrace extreme forms of Islam, which are introduced to them by members of their community, i.e. Imams belonging to such radical forms of Islam. Therefore young British people of Pakistani origin may practice a very conservative form of Islam up to the point of criticising their own parents, who they see as following a form of Islam too embedded in either the culture and practices of their country of origin or their host country.
Why, for instance in the British example, do parents and the local Pakistani Muslim community not react when faced with such an issue?

Politically, local Pakistani Muslim communities are led by leaders who maintain a conservative line developed by national leaders in order to preserve their position. As a general rule, their action is principally directed out of the community, with action aimed at Pakistan rather than towards the members of the community living in England. This situation leads to a difference between the needs and the problems of the young generation and what the leaders of the community preach. This difference is visible in the same way at the family level, where communication between young people of the 2nd and 3rd generations and their parents is increasingly difficult. Faced with the issues of delinquency, drugs and crime, parents leave it up to their community representatives to deal with prevention, knowing that for them this remains a taboo.

Notwithstanding, by following conservative Islam, young people to not instantly become terrorists. Defending their values through violent action, such as organising a terrorist attack, is not connected to this process of self-Islamic development.

What role should local authorities play?

The radicalisation of young people is a major concern for the British security services, especially since the attacks and failed attacks on English soil. However the lack of confidence between the Metropolitan Police and the Pakistani community makes any attempt at dialogue difficult. This difficulty began with investigations led by the Metropolitan police within the Pakistani Community which were characterised by a lack of knowledge of the community and Islam in particular. If local authorities do not act on this issue, leaving it up to the national government, initiatives carried out locally may still take place. For example in the county of Somerset in the Southwest of England, the “Minority Faith Protective Security Initiative” project emphasises protecting identified minority places of worship. However, the role of local authorities must be developed in England so that a real intercommunitie dialogue with the Pakistani community can take place.

In Germany the situation is completely different, as community dialogue is led by the federal government and on the initiative of two Turkish-Muslim associations. Different measures were proposed in a working group, which include: naming contacts so that future activities between authorities and Muslim communities can be better coordinated, and improving knowledge between partners by exchanging information (on the aims of the security services and on Islam). If the creation of this working group leads to future intercommunity dialogue, there will be a certain mistrust within this Muslim community. The community fears that this approach will not be beneficial, but will instead stigmatise them.
Questions to consider:
- Why is intercommunity dialogue undisputedly a tool in the fight against terrorism?
- What problems do young Muslims face?
- Why are they attracted to radical Islam?
- What is the reaction of their families? Of religious authorities? Of local authorities?
- What are the differences between German and British practices?
- What are the difficulties that local authorities face in trying to establish intercommunity dialogue?
- In your opinion, is intercommunity dialogue effective?

4.6 Guideline IV: “Victim support”

► What are the profiles of the victims?

There are three main types of victims, categorised depending on the seriousness of their physical injuries, mental injuries, or on how close they were to the attack. The first category, which covers the least people, includes primary victims who were close to the attack, be they mortally injured, injured survivors or people having taken part in the attack. The second group, secondary victims, is made up of the immediate family and friends of the primary victims. Finally, the most important group is that of the tertiary victims, which covers everyone who feels directly affected by the attacks due to the high number of victims or the strong media coverage of the attack, even if they were not at the actual attack site.

► What measures should be taken?

The nature of the measures that need to be taken for victims depends on a series of factors, but principally on the timing of the attack. In fact, managing victims of an attack can be divided into 4 phases. The first phase is prevention, and it occurs when authorities release security instructions regarding anything from suspect packages to protocols for evacuating an underground train for example. The second phase, strictly speaking, deals with the attack and the immediate responses to it, depending on whether or not the attack has finished. Different responses must be taken depending on the nature of the attack. In a hostage crisis, specific measures can be taken regarding family present on the spot and security teams for example. Meanwhile, during an explosion or the collapse of a tower, victim aid protocols are more difficult to respect, as the area is not known or under control. The third phase is limited to the short term and concerns on the one hand identifying and evacuating primary victims, and on the other hand supporting and informing secondary victims. Psychological support for all victims is crucial and should be ensured all along the fourth and final phase.
Why is psychological support fundamental?

The effects of a terrorist attack are not only physical, but also psychological. The emotion provoked by the death of hundreds of people, the destruction of buildings, that in some cases are symbols of Western society, can lead to people strongly identifying with the event and becoming very stressed and traumatic. As part of the fight against terrorism, authorities look for security measures to take which do not change the public’s way of life, and consequently the public should not become the vehicle of fears generated by the threat of terrorism. In this context, psychological support is important for two key reasons, on the one hand for the well being of the people involved, and on the other hand to maintain a feeling of security within the general public.

Somewhat contradictorily, psychological support is available during the first phases of the attack, but is rarely offered by the medical services in the long term. There is a fundamental lack of a joint approach between everyone involved with the victims. The creation of a status for victims in European legislation, as well as the launch of a database of victims of terrorism, are both tools which help with the victims’ stability. Direct psychological support is not enough; there must also be legal, political and media treatment, as all of these elements also form part of the psychological support necessary for victims of terrorism to get back to a normal life.

Questions to consider:
- What are the different types of victims of terrorist attacks?
- Do we need to treat victims of terrorist attacks differently to those of natural disasters?
- What are the different phases in managing an attack from the point of view of the victims?
- What measures should be taken for primary and secondary victims?
- What measures should be taken for tertiary victims?
- Why is psychological support so fundamental?
- What role does family play in the management of victims?
- In your opinion, is victim support effective?
5. CONCLUSION

5.1 The fight against terrorism: a local issue

The issue of the fight against terrorism at the local level, as tackled in the project Cities against Terrorism, has raised two important problems which we needed to tackle before the study could fully begin. The first concerns the definition of the local level, as there are a range of different people operating at the local level throughout Europe whose responsibilities, statuses and roles vary greatly from one State to another. This is clearly a result from the internal political organisation in each country and the disparity of local situations which has made comparison difficult. However, similarities have been made within each of the situations analysed by the partner universities, which will allow us to identify the issues as well as the key elements of the policies developed by the local authorities in each of the four areas of the fight against terrorism, which are: prevention, communication, community dialogue and victim support. Far from contributing to the creation of a local European model for the fight against terrorism, this analysis is first and foremost a set of guidelines. The lack of comparison is not only due to the difficulty in defining local actors, but also the new character of this issue. In effect, and somewhat contradictory, although the role of local authorities in the fight against terrorism appears essential, it is a sensitive political issue, as it raises questions linked to the internal organisation of the State, redefining relations between the centre and the rest of the country.

The consideration has led us to reflect on a second problem, which is the relevance of local actors, and cities in particular, in the fight against terrorism. For a long time, cities have enjoyed a cosmopolitan character, with the most important cities having a political and economic role, which is often linked to the size of the population. These different characteristics make cities the targets of choice for terrorists, as Arnaud Blin reminds us. But cities are also a strategic location for terrorists themselves, as they represent a favourable area to recruit new members, thus becoming technical and financial platforms to launch an attack. Furthermore, the density in the large cities can also offer terrorist groups a withdrawal policy, as shown by the disappearance of the commando suspected of having orchestrated the attacks in Madrid in 2005, where a tower block exploded. Finally, recognising the importance of local actors in the strategies of NGOs, such as the EFUS, as part of the fight against terrorism, as well as the strategies of international organisations such as the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, strengthens the idea that cities are becoming major actors in the fight against terrorism. There is also the political aspect of cities which are hit by attacks becoming symbols, such as New York, Madrid and London. Their cosmopolitan character and their economic, cultural and political importance transform them into symbols for this fight, and make them reconsider their role within this issue at the heart of the international community.
The relevance of local actors in the fight against terrorism is therefore unquestionable. One of the aims of the Cities Against Terrorism project was to identify on the one hand the role of local people in the national, local and international contexts, and on the other hand, to reflect on the issue in order to develop responses to each of the areas of prevention, communication, crisis management, intercommunity dialogue and victim support.

5.2 Recognising local actors at the national level

Recognising the importance of local actors in the fight against terrorism as much in political strategies as in theory undoubtedly requires the creation or the strengthening of legislation at the national and local levels, which identifies and defines the roles of local actors involved in the fight against terrorism. The UK and its Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is an interesting example, as it makes it obligatory for local authorities to have crisis management plans, including on terrorist threats. Nevertheless, the effects which lead to the local level becoming more important are paramount, as they must involve promoting decentralising the decision making processes, which would raise important political problems as each State is built on a unique political structure. For the heavily centralised states, this evolution will have the appearance of a revolution.

The development of national laws to better recognise the local level is all the more important as experiences on the ground show coordination between local and national authorities’ (vertical dimension) actions on the one hand, and between different local authorities on the other (horizontal dimension) need to be strengthened. The latter is also fundamental, notably in order to integrate the concept of preventing terrorism into local security strategies, as is the case in the borough of Halton, in the Northwest of England, where a “joint partnership” allows all local actors to be involved in developing the local security strategy.

Developing this vertical and horizontal coordination is not viable without the existence of a legal framework. This aspect is strengthened by the multi-level nature of the anti-terrorist approach, as this ideally must bring everyone together involved at the different levels of the State, as well as those involved in the relevant areas. Therefore, in order to be effective, this practical requirement must occur simultaneously to a development in legislation.

5.3 Antiterrorist policies focusing on coordination

The policies analysed as part of the Cities Against Terrorism project cover four priority areas, which are: prevention and communication, crisis management, intercommunity dialogue and victim support. During the work carried out by the partner universities in each of the involved countries, it became apparent that is was necessary to link, whenever possible, all of the areas. Indeed, crisis management must include victim support within its protocols, whereas intercommunity dialogue
is undoubtedly a prevention policy. Once again, coordination between everyone involved in the fight against terrorism is as essential as for anti-terrorist policies.

The first set of policies, which are prevention policies, represent the driving force behind the fight against terrorism in Europe today, and compliment approaches which put the emphasis more on security. This is nothing new, as in order to get closer to terrorist networks, tools are borrowed from crime prevention. Being explicitly part of the political agenda shows the need to enlarge the range of actions in order to prevent a terrorist attack which is as unpredictable as it is complex in its definition. In looking to better understand the causes of terrorism, the political authorities have to make the local level an essential link in the fight against terrorism, which explains the importance of prevention and the fact that it is an effective political measure.

Within the arsenal of prevention measures, a need to strengthen the socio-cultural dimension is apparent, be it in order to better identify the profile of a terrorist, despite the difficulties that this represents, or to launch community dialogue. This is particularly true for the latter, especially regarding relations between local authorities and the Muslim community. Far from stigmatising specifically this community, dialogue appears to be something which is very necessary, as shown by Asima Shaikh in her research on the Muslim Pakistani community in Southeast England, regarding the radicalisation of violence amongst young Muslims. She finds a similar situation throughout: local authorities feel powerless to try and prevent the increase in religious extremism and the politicisation of young Muslims, one of the consequences of which is the development of widespread violent radicalisation. Socio-economic factors, the generational conflict, and the fact that this young generation is experiencing an identity, are all factors which explain this phenomenon.

For local authorities, dialogue with members and representatives of the Muslim community is therefore a key issue. Local authorities should be granted greater powers to allow on the one hand better effectiveness and legitimacy, and on the other hand, knowledge of the Muslim world. In the first case, the development of a legal framework has allowed local authorities to recognise this proficiency, and which awards them the necessary legitimacy to launch and maintain dialogue with representatives of the Muslim community. The second aspect is more a question of expertise and requires setting up continual training courses, especially for people operating on the front line who are in charge of community dialogue. This is in fact one of the five measures suggested by the working group on “implementing confidence-building measures” between the German Federal authorities on the one hand and the Turkish-Muslim Organisation (Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion) and the German National Muslim Council (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD) on the other hand.
Training should not be limited to only those involved in community dialogue, but should be offered to everyone involved in the fight against terrorism, thus conforming to the guidelines defined by the Cities Against Terrorism project. Indeed, improving the training of local people involved in prevention for example, must take into account both the socio-economic context as well as the customs of foreign communities, and above all of the Muslim community. Training courses should be continual in order to ensure a greater knowledge of geopolitical issues linked to terrorism, something which appears necessary, even for local actors.

In this context, better communication between local authorities and representatives of foreign communities, in the form of information exchanges, is undoubtedly a key element. For local police authorities, this could include ways to create a rapprochement with the groups of the public which see police activities as exclusively repressive. Better communication about police aims and activities could therefore form the base on which intercommunity dialogue can be built, raising once again the question of coordination with those in charge of dialogue.

But the area which needs coordination developed between each sphere of responsibilities is clearly crisis management. Political authorities appear to have become fully aware of this, and are adapting in the image of the British model. Until recently, this operated based on Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) in a proactive manner, covering all aspects of crisis management for all types of incident. Since 2004, with the introduction of the Civil Contingencies Act, crisis management has been able to focus more on the long term, and above all to emphasise the multi-agency approach which involves all front-line actors. Although this is specific to the British legislation, it's something that other European local authorities should contemplate, for example Germany, which has already adopted the model with an adaptation allowing a specific role for the German Red Cross.

The main difference which is apparent between the cities studied in this research relative to crisis management is definitely the way in which the terrorist threat is integrated into existing approaches. For the cities that have experience, due to past or recent attacks, terrorism is tackled in a different way to natural disasters, such as earthquakes or floods. Clearly managing a terrorist attack and a natural disaster requires certain identical skills and protocols, but there are differences between how the two work. For example, regarding victim support, Lina Kolesnikova has shown the importance of offering psychological support in the short, medium and long term irrelevant of whether the victims were directly affected by the attack, or whether they were close or far from the attack. Medical and social care for victims over a long period requires an approach which allows them to be locally identified and treated. In other words, a database needs to be created which isn’t limited nationally, but covers all European nations. Similarly, the creation of a European legal status for victims of terrorism, as a compliment to national statuses - when they exist - could represent another step forward on the path to a more developed
Europeanisation with regards to the fight against terrorism. This process could also be accompanied by the creation of a European civil protection system based on the existing EU structures and the formation of a panel of European experts to support local authorities implement their antiterrorist measures.

5.4 Cities, actors in the fight against terrorism at the international level

The novelty of the security challenge that is the fight against terrorism and on which the Cities Against Terrorism project is focused is found precisely at this level, i.e. by further integrating the local dimension in national antiterrorist policies, in which cities are central. This evolution may lead to a greater development, by making the large European capitals actors in the international system in the image of New York City, a symbol as much as the potential leader in the fight against contemporary terrorism. In other words, the issue currently deals with the role and the place of cities, and notably operates within a forcibly renewed UN system.

In this way, the development of a European directive strengthening the role of local authorities within the fight against terrorism in the European Union, could represent an important stage on the path to recognising local actors as crucial for the fight against terrorism. It’s up to the cities themselves to adapt to this new status and to assert it within the international community.
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